


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20 December 1984

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



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20 December 1984

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MARSHAL OGARKOV WRITES ON VICTORY ANNIVERSARY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 84 (Signed to Press 19 Oct 84) pp 16-26

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov under the rubric: "On the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory": "Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms"]

[Text] The Soviet people, our foreign friends, and the entire progressive world public are preparing to celebrate widely and triumphantly the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War. The victory was a graphic and convincing demonstration of socialism's strength and indestructibility and of the triumph of the cause of the Great October.

Objectively considering, from present-day positions, the importance of the victory over fascist Germany, people of goodwill throughout the world are realizing more and more distinctly and clearly that it was a truly historic frontier in the face of mankind and had the most profound influence on the entire course of world development. Here they express feelings of gratitude and thanks primarily to the heroic Soviet people who, under the leadership of their Communist Party, in a struggle of unprecedented scale and ferocity against imperialism's shock force- Hitler's fascism--not only upheld their motherland's honor and independence but also saved the world from the brown plague and defended the future of world civilization against this plague.

The path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces toward victory in the Great Patriotic War was long and hard. It lasted nearly 4 years and passed through fierce, bloody fighting and battles, through the gravest ordeals. In 1941, exploiting temporary advantages, the enemy succeeded in invading deep into our country. But despite this, Soviet people were not demoralized and did not lose the will for victory over the invaders.

In the extraordinarily complex situation, the Communist Party very rapidly mobilized to the sacred war the powerful forces of Soviet society with which Great October had provided it and turned the country into a monolithic fighting camp. In this hard period, in bloody fighting, our Army, wearing down the enemy's crack divisions, destroyed his manpower and equipment, staunchly defended itself, and delivered counterstrikes.

Especially hard fighting, which had determining influence on the further course of the war developed in the fall of 1941 near Moscow. At that time the peoples of all countries of the world held their breath as they watched with alarm the historic battle that developed on the fields near Moscow. A grouping of nearly 2 million crack fascist troops descended on our motherland's capital.

In the hard defensive fighting from 30 September through 4 December, Soviet troops, wearing down and draining the enemy units and formations, obliged the enemy to shift to the offensive. Then the troops of the Western front and the Kalinin, and right flanks of the southwestern fronts, virtually without an operational pause, moved to a resolute counteroffensive on 5-6 December and by 8 January 1942 had driven the enemy 100-250 km back from the walls of Moscow, destroying 11 armored divisions, 4 motorized divisions, and 23 infantry divisions. At the concluding stage of the Moscow battle, during the subsequent general offensive, Soviet troops, in January through April 1942 defeated a further 16 enemy divisions and in the 4 months of the offensive drove the enemy back a total of 150-400 km. Only the urgent dispatch from West Europe of over 12 new divisions saved the fascist group of "center" armies from total defeat.

For fascist Germany, the Wehrmacht's unprecedented defeat was not simply a military setback, as the bourgeois falsifiers of history try to depict it, but a real shock to its entire military system.

The Soviet Armed Forces had forced Hitler's "invincible" army into a strategic defense all along the Soviet-German front and had confronted it with the prospect of waging a protracted war. The "Blitzkrieg" plan had failed. The main idea of fascist Germany's military doctrine was defeated.

The Soviet troops' victory near Moscow was an enormous inspiring incentive for the entire Soviet people in the further struggle against the aggressor, raised the USSR's international prestige still higher, eliminated the threat of a German invasion of Britain, strengthened the foundations of the anti-Hitler coalition, and helped to boost considerably the liberation movement of the peoples of occupied countries. It was here that the dawn of our great victory broke. After the Moscow battle, fascist Germany still, of course, possessed considerable economic and military potential. Nonetheless, after the losses it had incurred it was no longer able, as in 1941, to conduct offensive operations all along the Soviet-German front. And although in the summer of 1942, exploiting the absence of a second front in Europe, fascist Germany, transferring additional forces from the West, again launched a major offensive, it was no longer able to do this all along the Soviet-German front, but only on its southern flank.

In July 1942 the battle of Stalingrad--the biggest battle of World War II--began. The fascists were storming Stalingrad ferociously, increasing their troops from 38 divisions in mid-July to 69 in late August and over 80 divisions by late September, but, having lost about 700,000 of their soldiers and officers killed and wounded, they were still unable to break the resistance of the city's defenders. The heroic defense of Stalingrad proved invincible.

Moving to a swift counteroffensive in November 1942, the Soviet troops inflicted on Hitler's army here an even more crushing defeat than in the Moscow fighting. In just 6 and 1/2 months of constant fighting and hostilities during the battle of Stalingrad, the enemy lost up to half a million men--about one-fourth of his forces operating on the Soviet-German front at that time. Of his divisions, 32 were totally destroyed or taken prisoner and 16 were gravely defeated.

The defeat of the German fascist troops at the walls of the fortress on the Volga largely helped the success of the allies in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific and at the same time sharply aggravated the crisis in the fascist camp and undermined the confidence of the European satellites of Hitler's Germany in its ability to withstand the strikes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Militarist Japan and Turkey definitively renounced entering the war against the USSR.

The Soviet Armed Forces' victory on the Volga made a decisive contribution to the achievement of a fundamental breakthrough, not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire world war. It convincingly showed the whole world the Soviet Union's invincibility and its ability to defeat fascism by its own efforts. The battle of Stalingrad laid the foundation to the mass expulsion of the Nazi invaders from Soviet soil. After the battle of Stalingrad, Hitler's army could only prepare, 6 months later, a major new offensive on one narrow sector of the front--the Kursk Bulge. However, even that plan was not destined to be realized.

In July 1943 the renowned Kursk battle began. In a desperate attempt to seize the strategic initiative and come what may to change the course of the war in its favor, the German fascist command, with a view to carrying out operation "Citadel" to destroy the grouping of Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge, concentrated 50 divisions, including 15 armored and motorized divisions, in the regions of Orel and Belgorod.

In the gigantic battle at the Kursk Bulge, which became one of the most important stages on the path to our great victory, the Soviet Armed Forces definitively broke the back of Hitler's war machine.

In less than 2 months our troops defeated 30 enemy divisions here. The fascist army lost about 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and mortars, and over 3,700 aircraft. Developing the offensive and delivering crushing strikes, the Soviet troops cleared the Donbass and the left-bank Ukraine of the enemy and reached the Dnepr. Hitler's Germany could no longer recover from this defeat before the end of the war. If the battle of Moscow dispelled the myth of the fascist army's invincibility, if the battle of Stalingrad heralded the Wehrmacht's decline, then the fighting at Kursk and then on the Dnepr faced Hitler's Germany with a catastrophe and marked the conclusion of a fundamental breakthrough in the Soviet Union's war against Hitler's Germany and in World War II as a whole.

A correct understanding of the gist of the great battles of Moscow, Stalin-grad and Kursk won by the Soviet Armed Forces and an objective assessment of them are of not only historical but also sociopolitical importance. The development of a unified understanding of this question is important for scientific research and for a study of the history of World War II. The role played by the correct assessment of the battles waged is also important in the present keen ideological struggle against the bourgeois falsifiers.

The achievements of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in 1943, at the front and behind the lines, created favorable conditions for the complete expulsion of the German fascist invaders from our country. This was done in 1944, which has gone down in history as a year of decisive victories.

The Supreme High Command Headquarters and the General Staff embarked on the drafting of a plan for military operations for 1944 during the fighting and hostilities in the fall of 1943. On the basis of a profound, comprehensive analysis of the world military-political situation and the position and correlation of forces of the warring sides, it was concluded that there was a real possibility of the Soviet Armed Forces' conducting a number of large-scale offensive operations in 1944 and not on one or two strategic salients, as had been the case in previous years of the war, but all along the Soviet-German front, from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, with a view to defeating the main forces of fascist Germany and its allies, totally liberating the USSR's territory, and moving hostilities beyond the USSR.

Continuing combat operations in secondary theaters (Africa, Italy, and the Atlantic), the United States and Britain at that time adopted a temporizing stance and delayed opening a second front in Europe.

Hitler's command, assessing the prevailing situation on the Eastern front, sought to use strategic defense to exhaust the strength of the Soviet Army and deprive it of its offensive potential. But these enemy plans were thwarted.

The Soviet Armed Forces' military operations during the year of decisive battles were unleashed a week before the start of 1944 in the Right-bank Ukraine with an offensive by the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Ukrainian fronts under the command of Generals N.F. Vatutin, I.S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, and F.I. Tolbukhin. Despite the complex conditions of the unsettled winter weather and the bad roads in the spring, the Soviet troops, delivering consistent and one-time strikes, broke the enemy defense within a sector of 1,400 km from Pripyat to the lower reaches of the Dnepr and defeated about 100 enemy divisions. By the summer of 1944 they had completely liberated the Right-bank Ukraine, the Crimea, and a substantial part of Moldavia and had reached the border with Romania and moved hostilities to its territory. As a result of Soviet troops' successful operations on the southwestern salient, an advantageous situation was created for launching strategic offensive operations on other salients of the Soviet-German front.

As early as mid-January 1944, when the Hitlerite command's entire attention was focused on the Right-bank Ukraine, the offensive of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began under the command of Generals L.A. Govorov and K.A. Meretskov in conjunction with the troops of the 2d Baltic front under the command of General M.M. Popov. Delivering powerful strikes against the enemy, Soviet troops defeated the deeply echeloned defense of the armies of the "North" group and by late February had reached the Narva-Godv-Pskov line. Advancing 220-280 km. they defeated 26 enemy divisions, liberated Leningrad from the blockade, purged almost all of Leningrad Oblast and part of Kalinin Oblast, and created favorable preconditions for offensive operations on the Karelian Isthmus and the Baltic.

Simultaneously with the operations in the Right-bank Ukraine and near Leningrad, the Soviet Army launched offensive operations on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. The troops of the 1st Baltic, Western, and Belorussian (as of 17 February 1944 the 1st Belorussian) fronts under the command of Generals I.K. Bagramyan, V.D. Sokolovskiy, and K.K. Rokossovskiy used their combat active operations to reliably tie down the group of "Center" armies and prevented its forces and weapons from maneuvering to the Right-bank Ukraine and Leningrad, where the troops of Hitler's reich were suffering a grave defeat. Here our troops liberated part of Belorussia and improved their operational position, capturing in depth the flanks of the group of "Center" armies and creating favorable conditions for its defeat.

The June 1944 summer offensive was opened initially by the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian (the commander was General K.A. Meretskov) fronts in Karelia with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs. Having broken the Finns' powerful defense on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet troops liberated almost the entire territory of Karelia by late August. In early September the Finnish Government asked for peace. Thus, after Italy, fascist Germany lost one more ally.

On 23 June 1944 there began in Belorussia the very large-scale "Bagration" operation by troops of the 1st Baltic front (the commander was General I.D. Chernyakhoskiy), the 2d Belorussian front (the commander was General G.F. Zakhorov), and the 1st Belorussian front (the commander was General K.K. Rokossovskiy). Moving to the offensive on a sector of over 1,100 km, the Soviet troops broke through the enemy defense with almost simultaneous strikes on six sections on a front of 500 km and surrounded and destroyed large fascist groups groupings in the regions of Vitebsk and Bobruysk. Developing the offensive on converging salients, they surrounded a 105,000-strong enemy grouping east of Minsk and soon annihilated it. During the further offensive, the Soviet troops liberated Belorussia, almost all of Lithuania, part of Latvia, and the eastern regions of Poland and reached Eastern Prussia. During the "Bagration" operation, 17 enemy divisions and 3 enemy brigades were totally destroyed and 50 divisions suffered heavy losses.

The successful development of the Belorussian operation created favorable preconditions for conducting the Lvov-Sandomir operation to defeat the "North Ukraine" group of armies. On 13 July 1944 troops of the 1st Ukrainian

front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev delivered a powerful strike on the Rava-Russkaya and Lvov salients and broke through the enemy defense within a 200-km zone. Developing the offensive, on 27 July the troops liberated Lvov and in the first days of August they forced the Vistula on the march and seized a bridgehead in the Sandomir region. In their offensive operation the Soviet troops destroyed 8 enemy divisions and caused enormous personnel losses to 32 divisions. West Ukraine and the southeast part of Poland were liberated.

The echoes of the triumphal salutes in honor of the Soviet Army's victories in Belorussia and the western oblasts of the Ukraine had not died down before a new strike was delivered against the fascist invaders, this time in Moldavia. On 20 August troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts under the command of Generals R.Ya. Malinovskiy and F.I. Tolbukhin began the Yassy-Kishinev operation.

Delivering powerful strikes, by 24 August they had already completed the encirclement of 18 of the 25 German divisions of the "South Ukraine" group of armies. A day before troops of the left flank of the 3d Ukrainian front had surrounded the 3d Romanian Army in the Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy region. During the Soviet Army's successful offensive favorable conditions were created for the Romanian people's armed uprising, as a result of which the country's antifascist forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the dictatorship ruling the country. On 23 August the new Romanian Government decided to withdraw from the alliance with Germany and declared war on it.

Having successfully completed the Yassy-Kishinev operation by the end of August, the troops of the 2d Ukrainian front, with the participation of Romanian troop units, liberated almost all of Romania in September and reached the border with Hungary and Yugoslavia. The troops of the 3d Ukrainian front at the same time went into Bulgarian territory. The people of Bulgaria, led by the Communist Party, overthrew the fascist regime on 9 September and formed a democratic government which took up arms against fascist Germany. Developing the success that had been achieved, the troops of the 3d Ukrainian front moved hostilities to Yugoslav territory in late September and set about liberating the country from Hitler's yoke. At the same time, troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts had encircled an enemy grouping of nearly 180,000 men near Budapest. On 28 December 1944 the new Hungarian Government declared war on Hitler's Germany.

In late August 1944 an antifascist armed uprising erupted in Slovakia. To render fraternal aid to the Slovak people, Soviet troops used the forces of the 4th Ukrainian front (under the command of General I. Ye. Petrov) and part of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian front to carry out the East Carpathian offensive operation. Having broken through the enemy defense Soviet troops, together with General L. Svoboda's 1st Czechoslovak corps, crossed the Carpathian mountains in the Dukla region in early October and created conditions for Czechoslovakia's liberation.

In the fall of 1944, the troops of the Karelian front under the command of General K.A. Meretskov, with the assistance of the Northern Fleet under the command of Admiral A.G. Golovko, under the exceptionally difficult Arctic conditions defeated the 20th German Mountain Army and reached the Norwegian borders.

The Soviet Armed Forces' crushing strikes in 1943 and early 1944, which essentially presaged the fate of fascist Germany, compelled the U.S. and British ruling circles to set about opening up a second front in Europe. On 6 June 1944 a large-scale allied troops landing operation began in Normandy under the command of U.S. General D. Eisenhower. By late June the number of allied troops landed on French territory already totaled about 900,000. The operation's success was largely helped by the fact that the German fascist command had its main forces--about 230 of the most combat-capable divisions in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, including 18 divisions at the formation stage.

Western historians are making tremendous efforts in an attempt to prove today that when the second front in Europe was opened up it became virtually the main front of World War II. Those stories are absolutely unfounded. The facts convincingly refute them.

Thus, for instance, in the summer and fall of 1944, U.S.-British troops destroyed 35 enemy divisions, while the Soviet Army destroyed and captured 96 divisions and 24 brigades, defecting 219 divisions and 22 brigades over the same period. Despite the allied troops' offensive launched in France and Italy, Hitler's command kept the main mass of its forces--185 divisions--on the Eastern front in late 1944 and only 74 divisions on the Western front.

Even after the second front had been opened up in Europe the Soviet Armed Forces thus remained the main strike force of the anti-Hitler coalition and continued to make the decisive contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany.

The year of 1944 was truly a year of decisive victories for the Soviet Union. As a result of the successful strategic offensive operations on the Right-bank Ukraine, in the Crimea, and near Leningrad and Novgorod and in Karelia, Belorussia, the West Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic region, and the Arctic, the Soviet Armed Forces totally purged the Soviet land of Hitler's invaders and moved hostilities to the territory of the countries of central and southeast Europe occupied by the fascists. Educated by the Communist Party in a spirit of proletarian internationalism, the USSR Armed Forces rendered tremendous selfless aid to those countries' peoples in their liberation from the foreign yoke. By late 1944, Romania, Bulgaria, a considerable part of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and North Norway had been purged of German fascist occupiers by Soviet troops.

One of the most important political results of the Soviet Union's imposing victories was the collapse of the fascist bloc in Europe. Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria broke off their alliance with Germany and declared war on it. The flanks of its strategic front in the east were exposed. A

number of neutral states completely halted supplies of strategic war materials to Germany. Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with it. By late 1944 fascist Germany's only remaining ally was Japan. The struggle of the enslaved countries' peoples against Hitler's fascism and Japanese militarism was kindled with new force. The victorious completion of the peoples' imposing battle against the forces of reaction and obscurantism became increasingly visible.

The USSR's military successes exerted decisive influence on the fundamental sociopolitical changes in the European countries it had liberated. Under the leadership of the communist and workers parties the people's masses of these countries embarked on the path of carrying out popular-democratic and socialist revolutions, which were the continuation and development of the process of man's revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, whose foundation was laid by the Great October.

In 1944 the Soviet Armed Forces carried out 10 major strategic offensive operations during which many dozen front and army operations were carried out. They graphically showed the superiority of Soviet military art. Strategic operations like the Belorussian, Yassy-Kishinev, Lvov-Sandomir, and other strategic operations which have considerably enriched Soviet military science have been added as golden assets to its treasury.

In particular questions of preparing and mounting strategic offensive operations by the fronts' groups, of selecting the avenues for a main strike and means of encircling and defeating large enemy groupings, achieving rapid offensive rates, organizing interaction, and so forth were further developed. Questions of the combat application of mobile army groups and fronts, artillery and aircraft attack and all-around backup for combat operations were also creatively resolved.

Winning major new victories in 1944, the USSR Armed Forces again showed the whole world the invincibility and tremendous potential of the socialist social and state system. These victories were the result of the Communist Party's multifaceted organizational and political work and the entire Soviet people's heroic efforts both at the front and behind the lines. They raised still higher the international prestige and influence of the world's first socialist state.

Developing the successes achieved in 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces in 1945 delivered new crushing strikes against the enemy in 1945. The apotheosis of the Soviet people's Great Patriotic War against Hitler's Germany was the imposing Berlin operation, during which Soviet troops defeated a fascist troop grouping of almost 1 million.

The scarlet banner of victory fluttered proudly over nazism's overthrown citadel, while the standards of Hitler's "invincible" army lay at the feet of the heroic Soviet people, the victorious people.

During the war the Soviet Armed Forces were firmly and skillfully led by the Supreme High Command Headquarters headed by J.V. Stalin and by its operational organ of control--the General Staff. They constantly felt the tense pulse of war, creatively planned operations and led them precisely, trained strategic reserves in a planned manner, and used them efficiently and skillfully, carefully considering the development of events on the enormous expanses gripped by World War II. A great personal contribution to the victory over the enemy was made by representatives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters and chiefs of general staff at the Great Patriotic War period: G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, B.M. Shaposhnikov, and A.I. Antonov. The commanders, staffs, and political organs of the fronts, fleets, armies and flotillas invested a great deal of labor in preparing and conducting operations.

During the war the mighty strength of our Communist Party, the great leader and experienced and talented guide of the Soviet people, headed by its combat staff, the Leninist Central Committee, was revealed in all its magnitude. The Communist Party acted with Leninist wisdom and vigor and, as during the civil war, became a truly fighting party. While early in the war every ninth serviceman was a communist, by the end of the war the figure was one in every four.

The Soviet people were the main creators of the victory. The victory was selflessly forged at the front and behind the lines by Soviet people of all nationalities and professions, by urban and rural workers, men and women, Communists, Komsomol members, and nonparty people. It was truly an exploit of all the people. The profoundly just nature of the Great Patriotic War generated the high morale of the troops, the unprecedented scale of the partisan warfare, and the unrivaled labor enthusiasm of the country's entire population.

The results of the Great Patriotic War convincingly showed yet again that imperialism cannot halt the advance of socialism, that there have not been, are not, and will not be forces in the world that can bring the great Soviet people to their knees. "June 1941 will not be repeated," Comrade K.U. Chernenko stresses. "Immediate retribution will overtake any aggressor. Let everyone--our friends and our foes--know that."

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War marked the start of a new stage in world history and gave rise to the emergence of objective conditions and opportunities for the eradication of military cataclysms from the life of the world community.

The 40th anniversary of our great victory is approaching. In the grim war years the invincible aspiration of millions of people throughout the world to gain victory was inspired not only by the belief that they would soon be rid of fascist enslavement but also by the hope that nothing of the kind would ever happen again. They could not allow the thought that after 6 years of bloody nightmare there would be maniacs who would resolve to trample on the memory of tens of millions of people who had given their lives for victory and to push mankind into the abyss of a new war. People thirsted for peace and had an indisputable right to it.

But World War II did not eliminate the source of constant military danger that imperialism represents. Moreover, as a result of the continuing general crisis of capitalism the aggressiveness of imperialist policy has increased.

The new claimants to world rule--the U.S. militarists--have learned nothing from the experience of their German fascist ideological predecessors and rivals and have seized on their delirious designs. Growing very rich on the blood and suffering of millions, blackmailing the world with the nuclear weapons created at the end of World War II, they have considered it almost their natural right to win world dominion and eliminate all those who are preventing them from establishing it.

There has been a particularly sharp increase in reckless bellicosity in the United States in the eighties with the arrival in the White House of the administration of R. Reagan, the stooge of the most reactionary and aggressive circles of U.S. imperialism. It was to their advantage and in accordance with their scenario, in the heat of his imperial ambitions that he deliberately broke off the talks in Geneva and unleashed the unrestrained arms race and is thoughtlessly pushing the world toward nuclear war. The U.S. President noisily declared a "crusade" against socialism. Counter to sanity, using the short-sightedness of the ruling circles of a number of NATO countries, he began to deploy first-strike nuclear weapons in West Europe; he allows himself to juggle irresponsibly and cynically with "jokes" about nuclear bomb attacks on the USSR.

You ask: How should all these threats be understood? Do they mean that the destiny of war and peace is wholly in the hands of the U.S. "hawks" and that all that is left for mankind is to bow its head in submission and wait for its fate to be decided by madmen? Do they mean that there is no force in the world capable of twisting the arms of the maniacs who have raised the sword of death over the world? No, that is not what they mean. War can and must be prevented. The lessons of history demand it. And for that the sociopolitical and military-technical prerequisites exist.

As is well known, World War I began a decade after the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war--one of the first major armed clashes of the era of imperialism. At the time it was virtually impossible to avert it. It was unleashed under conditions when capitalism was the only all-encompassing system, when the leading capitalist states' political course was wholly determined by the bourgeoisie which ruled the international arena undivided. The peace-loving forces were still extremely weak and uncoordinated while the leaders of the social democratic parties of the majority of European countries, betraying their people's interests, had embarked on the path of chauvinism and open support for the bourgeoisie's militarist policy. World War I continued 4 years and took 10 million human lives.

An interval of 20 years separated World War II from World War I. And although in that time capitalism was no longer an all-embracing system, the threat of war was nonetheless not successfully averted. In the prewar years the world's first and at that time only socialist state, the Soviet Union, pursuing a consistent policy of peace resolutely advocated

curbing the fascist aggressors and creating a system of collective security. However, all the USSR's efforts to preserve peace encountered the short-sighted anti-Soviet policy of the United States, Britain, France, and a number of other capitalist states which encouraged the Nazi aggressors to unleash war in East Europe and to undertake a "crusade" against the USSR. World War II lasted 6 years and took over 50 million lives.

Nearly 40 years have elapsed since World War II. The political map of the world has now been fundamentally transformed. The defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan in 1945, the implementation of socialist revolutions in a number of countries, and the formation of a world socialist system, the building of developed socialism in the USSR and the successful building of a new society in other fraternal countries, the upsurge of the national liberation movement and the complete collapse of the colonial system have fundamentally altered the nature of the world and the correlation of class and sociopolitical forces in the international arena in favor of socialism.

Ever new states are dropping from the capitalist system, now in one part of the world, now in another. Capitalism's sphere of influence is narrowing inexorably. Capitalism, U.S. capitalism in particular, despite its still considerable reserves, has ceased to be an economic, political and military force monopolizing the present-day world and cannot determine the fate of mankind on its own.

In our day the imperialist bourgeoisie has become the "declining, decadent, internally dead, reactionary" class. (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 26 pp 145-146). That is why the unprecedented impudence of its monopolist ruling clique which is threateningly and ostentatiously brandishing its "atomic stick" and noisy declarations of "crusades" against socialism is by no means a sign of strength, but a manifestation of weakness, of the historical futility of the capitalist system. The correlations of forces in the international arena has changed irreversibly in favor of the forces of peace and social progress. Real objective preconditions have formed for the elimination of war from the life of society.

On the historical plane the theoretical and practical activity of the leader of the world proletariat, V.I. Lenin, and his creative development of K. Marx' teaching under new historical conditions serve as a classic example of a profoundly scientific approach to the solution of questions of society's development, including the vitally important problem of war and peace. On the basis of a profound, all-around analysis of capitalism and its supreme stage--imperialism--Lenin scientifically substantiated the possibility and inevitability of the victory of socialism, initially in a few or even just one individual capitalist country. Lenin's brilliant scientific perspicacity was fully confirmed by the victory of socialist revolution in Russia and by the entire course of subsequent historical development.

In our time the Communist Party, guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism and creatively developing and enriching it with application to the present situation, has drawn the conclusion that war is not fatally inevitable. Although the class nature and aggressive essence of imperialism remain

unchanged, the deepening of the overall crisis of capitalism and the intensification of socialism's role in international life, the formation and steady development of the world socialist system, the raising of the socialist community countries; defense capability to the level of the guaranteed destruction [sokrusheniye] of any aggressor, and the increase in the cohesion and activation of the Nonaligned Movement and of other peace-loving forces and movements considerably restrict imperialism's opportunities for unleashing aggressive wars, especially against the socialist countries, and create sociopolitical and military-technical preconditions for preventing a new world war. Here, of course, the threat of war still remains, but it can be neutralized.

The socialist communist countries headed by the Soviet Union, which knows better than any other state the true price of the horrors of war and is therefore waging a tireless struggle against it with particular persistence, are the decisive factor in preventing war and the main bulwark of the world's peoples in the struggle for peace. The Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy has for nearly 7 decades now been subject to no considerations of expediency and is aimed at the all-around consolidation of peace.

The Communist Party has always been opposed to militarism and the export of revolution. War does not accord with the nature of socialism. It is well known that right up to the Great October Socialist Revolution the party's Program made no provision at all for the creation of a regular army. The Russian working people had sufficient volunteer formations--the Red Guard and the revolutionary units of the old army--to overthrow tsarism and the bourgeois provisional government in 1917. Only the danger of military intervention, the actions of the internal counterrevolution supported by foreign capital, and the threat to the existence of Soviet power obliged Lenin and the Communist Party to set about creating the regular Red Army for the sole purpose of "protecting the gains of the revolution...against all the enemies of the people..." (V.I. Lenin: "Complete Collected Works," Vol 35, p 216).

The consistent struggle for peace and the consolidation of international security comprise the general line of the foreign policy activity of the Communist Party and Soviet state. And the economic and military might of the Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist community and their armed forces' constant high combat readiness are the main restraining factor and insurmountable barrier to an aggressor in his attempts to kindle the conflagration of a new world war. It is for that reason that our defense potential, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed out, "is not only a guarantee of the Soviet people's constructive labor but also a guarantee of universal world peace."

To attempt to break the established military equilibrium and to seek military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries is an undertaking no less futile than nurturing hopes of a victory for the aggressor in nuclear war. The Soviet people and their allies in the Warsaw Pact are not seeking military superiority over other countries and our military doctrine has always been and is of a strictly defensive orientation. But they have sufficient forces and potential to prevent superiority over themselves.

The international communist and workers' movement has become a powerful, influential present-day political force in the struggle for peace and social progress. It now numbers about 100 parties in its ranks. Reflecting the feelings and aspirations of the peoples' broadest masses, the communist and workers parties advocate the conservation of the cause of disarmament and raise the people's masses to the all-around activation of the antiwar movement and the struggle to spare mankind from the threat of a nuclear missile war. The organized working class' participation in the antiwar movement is growing. This imparts a more resolute nature to the entire movement and increases its degree of organization.

An important factor in the struggle for the prevention of war and for peaceful coexistence is the national liberation movement and the enhanced role of the Nonaligned Movement. By the early eighties there were over 110 developing states that had achieved national independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and of these about 20 have chosen a path of socialist orientation.

As a component of the peace movement, the peoples' struggle for independence and social progress invariably leads to the steady weakening of world imperialism's positions, the narrowing of its social base, and the further intensification of its overall crisis. All this as a whole helps to prevent wars.

The world's peoples are responding to the stepping up of the threat of war by the broad scope of the antiwar movement and the struggle for peace. The populations of Britain, France, Italy and many other countries greeted the deployment of U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles in West Europe with mass, unceasing protest demonstrations. These demonstrations have encompassed literally all social strata--from workers and scientists to clergymen, parliamentarians, and housewives. The peoples' struggle against U.S. acts of aggression in the Near East and Central America has acquired broad scope. All the attempts of the Reagan administration and its vassals to undermine or at least weaken the pitch of this movement are proving futile.

The growing scope of the antiwar, anti-imperialist struggle throughout the world is a reflection of a common natural historical law of social development: The enhancement of the people's role as the makers of history. The working masses are intervening increasingly persistently and vigorously in the world's destiny and in the solution of the most important and urgent problem of the present day, the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. There is no doubt that as the masses become even more deeply aware of the menacing danger of the pernicious consequence of a thermonuclear conflict and of its true sources, the scope of this movement will grow steadily. It cannot be ignored even now. Of course, of itself the antiwar movement does not fully resolve the problem of war and peace. However, it can considerably restrict the freedom of action of the unbridled bourgeois rulers and their masters.

The strength of the working masses' pressure and awareness, Lenin pointed out, has frequently "snapped off the spearhead of the imperialists' bellicose policy." ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 42, p 134). Under present conditions the influence of this force has increased by many times and it is becoming dangerous to ignore it.

Alongside the above-mentioned sociopolitical factors there are now other purely military preconditions restricting imperialism's opportunity for unleashing new wars. These preconditions are caused by the rapid scientific and technical progress which has led to a dialectical leap, to a veritable revolution in military matters. The appearance of nuclear weapons, with their unbelievable strike power in 1945 and their rapid subsequent improvement posed a new way the question of the expediency of war as a means of achieving a political end. The grim reality of our day is that, in contrast to the past, the very correlation of very important categories like "war" and "policy" has changed. Only when you have definitely lost your sense of reason can you try to find arguments or to define a goal that would justify unleashing a world nuclear war, thus confronting human civilization with the threat of destruction. "Hence," Comrade K.U. Cherneko has indicated, "the irrefutable conclusion that it is criminal to view thermonuclear war as a national, almost 'legitimate' continuation of policy."

Through the fault of the United States, which has launched an unbridled arms race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been accumulated in the world today which, from the military viewpoint, are already truly absurd. Thus, for instance, in just one first strike, U.S. strategic nuclear forces can now use about 12,000 nuclear charges with a total yield hundreds of times in excess of the total yield of all explosives and ammunition employed by all the world's states in the entire 6 years of World War II. And that is just for the above-mentioned forces in the United States alone. Yet if you consider that there is approximate parity in the sides' nuclear arms, you do not need to be a military specialist to understand that the further stockpiling of these arms becomes simply pointless. Excessively large stockpiles of nuclear weapons not only do not guarantee security and impunity for any aggressive state but rather the reverse: They increase the danger that it will be subjected to crushing retribution from the victim of aggression.

Thus, for the first time in history the main sides confronting each other have created a surplus of military potentials, primarily nuclear potentials. And this alters the qualitative aspect of the phenomenon in military matters. As a result a paradox arises: On the one hand there would seem to be a process whereby a nuclear state's potential for destroying an enemy and safeguarding its own security is steadily increasing and on the other there is just as steady and one might say an even sharper reduction in the potential for aggressors to deliver a so-called "disarming strike" against their main adversary.

The point is that with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missile weapons now achieved, it is already simply impossible for an aggressor to totally destroy the opposite side's similar weapons in a single strike. And an immediate, crushing response using even the limited quantity of nuclear

weapons remaining to the defending side—a response making it impossible for the aggressor subsequently to wage war or to conduct any serious operations—becomes inevitable under present conditions. The transatlantic strategists' counting on the possibility of waging a "limited" nuclear war has no foundation whatsoever. Any limited use of nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the sides' entire nuclear arsenal. That is the grim logic of war. The Pentagon's dreams of the possibility of a so-called "unanswered limited nuclear strike" against the enemy's main centers and control points are all the more unsound. These strictly bureaucratic and militarily incompetent arguments are absolutely unfounded and dangerous. The propaganda of these ignorant arguments must be exposed.

All this is evidence that Lenin's conclusion that the danger of war "will not cease as long as world imperialism exists" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 42, p 173) undoubtedly retains its topicality even today. However, the qualitatively new historical, sociopolitical and military-technical preconditions and circumstances which have formed in the present-day world create conditions for eliminating wars as a sociopolitical phenomenon and primarily world wars which contain the threat of the destruction of all world civilization.

Nearly 40 years separate us from the spring of 1945, which announced the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War. It was great victory for the sake of peace and life on earth, for the triumph of freedom, democracy and social progress. The year of 1944, the year of the Soviet Armed Forces' decisive victories over fascism, was of special importance on the path toward this bright and joyous holiday.

The lessons of the past war are of abiding significance today. And "the main lesson," the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War" stresses, "is that war must be combated before it begins. And the opportunities and forces, considerable forces, for doing this now exist. Today the aggressive circles of imperialism can no longer fail to consider the growing weight and influence of these forces or the might of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. And, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko noted, "as long as military and political tension exists, as long as the nuclear missile threat from the United States and the NATO states looms over our country, we must keep our powder dry, always be on guard to ensure that the correlation of forces does not change in imperialism's favor and that we do not prove to be the weaker."

These instructions from the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium accord with the aspirations of the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole world. At the same time they are a program for the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces whose sacred duty, together with their combat allies in the Warsaw Pact, the armies of the other socialist community countries, is to reliably defend the gains of socialism and peace on earth.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

GRISHIN, YEPISHEV INAUGURATE SERIES OF LECTURES

PM231549 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Nov 84 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Devoted to the Great Victory"]

[Text] Down through the centuries the feat of the Soviet people, who broke the back of mankind's most evil enemy--Hitlerite fascism--will never fade. The USSR's victory in the Great Patriotic War fully revealed the advantages of socialism and its enormous economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual potential.

Municipal sociopolitical lectures devoted to the 40th anniversary of the great victory opened in Moscow 20 November. They are being run by the Moscow party gorkom, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the AUCCTU, and the board of the "Znaniye" All-Union Society.

In opening the lectures, V. V. Grishin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, stressed that Muscovites, like all Soviet people, are preparing with great enthusiasm to mark the glorious date of the fatherland's victory. Forty shock labor weeks are being held in honor of the 40th anniversary of the victory.

A report entitled "The CPSU--The Inspirer and Organizer of the Soviet People's Heroic Struggle in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" was delivered by Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, at the opening of the sociopolitical lectures.

The lectures will continue until May 1985.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

40TH ANNIVERSARY OF COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 84 pp 80-83

[Article by Lt Col B. Ivanov: "Memorable Dates of Socialist Romania"]

[Excerpts] 1984 is a jubilee year for the people of the Socialist Republic of Romania. 23 August marks the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the country from the Nazi yoke and 25 October the 40th anniversary of the day when Romanian territory was completely cleared of Nazis by the Soviet and Romanian troops. This was an historic moment in the life of the Romanian people which became possible due to the victorious offensive of the Soviet Army which had crushed the Nazi military machine and freed many peoples from the yoke of Naziism. 25 October is celebrated as Romanian Army Day and this year is the 40th time.

The Romanian people, like the other European peoples, have linked their liberation to the victories of the Soviet Army over Nazi Germany, victories which by the summer of 1944, even before the Allied opening of the second front in Europe, had already predetermined the outcome of the war. Long before the Anglo-American troops had landed in Normandy, on the Soviet-German Front, the main and decisive front, a fundamental change had already come about which determined the outcome of the entire World War II. Namely the Soviet Army in fierce battles had broken the back of the Nazi monster.

The Romanian people also paid a dear price for the sway held in the nation by the Nazis and their todies who in 1940 established the Antonescu military-fascist dictatorship and brought Romania into the infamous anti-Soviet war on the side of the "Third Reich." This was done contrary to the interests of the nation and the will of a predominant majority of the people. The war led to the exhausting of the economy, to the hunger and poverty of the workers and to the loss of almost 400,000 men on the Eastern Front. Among the population indignation and hate for Naziism and the fascist regime grew and class contradictions became exacerbated.

In telling the people the bitter truth, the communists pointed to the only possible way out of the war, that is, a rupture with Nazi Germany and the conducting of a merciless struggle against the Nazis and their supporters. Upon the initiative of the Communist Party, in 1943, the Patriotic Anti-Hitler Front was

established underground. After the defeat of the Nazi and Romanian-fascist troops in the historic battle on the Volga, antiwar and anti-Nazi moods began to grow particularly actively in Romania.

In carrying out their international duty, the Soviet troops at the end of March 1944, in pursuing the Nazis which were retreating under the pressure of the Second Ukrainian Front, crossed the border river of the Prut on an 85-km sector and entered Romania. It was the first nation which the Soviet troops entered with a liberation mission. Loyal to its peace-loving policy, the USSR in April 1944 proposed to the Romanian government that a truce be concluded under the condition that Romania would immediately break its alliance with Nazi Germany and enter on the side of the anti-Nazi coalition. However, the Antonescu government refused to accept these demands.

In the last stage of the war, the combat friendship of the armies and peoples of the Soviet Union and Romania was formed and tested. After the historic events which occurred in 1944 in the country, Romania fought along with the Soviet Union until the complete defeat of Nazism and its troops participated in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The friendship of the Soviet and Romanian peoples was strengthened by the blood shed in the joint battles. Over 286,000 Soviet soldiers and officers and 58,000 Romanian ones lost their lives or were wounded during the battles to liberate the nation.

During the postwar years, the Romanian workers under the leadership of the Communist Party have turned their nation from a backward, agrarian one into a socialist state with a diversified, developing economy. In the successes of Romania a major role has been played by its years-long economic collaboration within CEMA and by the military-political collaboration in the Warsaw Pact. The liberation of Romania and its socialist development clearly show that the Romanian people were able to win true independence relying on the friendship and aid of the world's first socialist state founded by the great Lenin.

The Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid signed on 4 February 1948 between the Soviet Union and Romania reinforced the historic change in Soviet-Romanian relations. It became the basis for the development of the fraternal friendship and all-round collaboration between our countries and peoples. This was the first equal treaty for Romania which guaranteed its independence and laid a foundation for the all-round development of relations between the two countries on the principles of socialist internationalism. The new Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid signed on 7 July 1970 and the Joint Soviet-Romanian Statement of 24 November 1976 opened up broad opportunities for Romanian development. These became a secure basis for the further deepening and broadening of collaboration both on a bilateral basis as well as within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

In celebrating the glorious jubilees of their history on the eve of the 8th RCP [Romanian Communist Party] Congress, the communists, all the workers of socialist Romania and the men of the Romanian Army have proudly summed up what they have accomplished, they are assessing the goals and planning for the future. At present, Romania maintains diplomatic relations with 139 countries and trade relations with 150. The country produces 53-fold more industrial product than in 1938 and 4-fold more agricultural product. The standard of living of the

workers is growing and science and culture are developing. In 1984, the Danube-Black Sea Canal was put into operation and this is the major construction project in the country in recent years.

In terms of the volume of Romanian foreign trade, the share of the socialist countries is presently around 50 percent and the Soviet Union is firmly established as its chief partner. Extensive Soviet technical assistance made it possible for the republic to build and reconstruct more than 130 enterprises, shops and other facilities in the leading industrial sectors.

The Soviet people are pleased by the successes of socialist construction achieved by the Romanian workers under the leadership of the Communist Party in close collaboration with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries. Constantly strengthening collaboration with the USSR and mutual aid help in more successfully resolving the arising problems and overcoming the difficulties which are still often encountered in daily life.

The Soviet-Romanian summit talks held in June 1984 in Moscow were a new major contribution to strengthening all-round collaboration between the CPSU and the RCP, the Soviet Union and Romania. In the talks held in Moscow between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet K. U. Chernenko and the General Secretary of the RCP and Romanian President N. Ceausescu, mutual determination was affirmed to further strengthen allied relations between the USSR and Romania and to broaden cooperation in political, economic, defense, cultural and other areas both on a bilateral basis as well as within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.

The parties emphasized the importance of the Warsaw Pact as an effective instrument for ensuring the security of the allied socialist countries, for the joint elaboration and implementation of their peace-loving foreign policy and as an important factor for maintaining and strengthening peace in Europe. As was pointed out in a speech on 4 June 1984 by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K. U. Chernenko, at a dinner honoring the General Secretary of the RCP and Romanian President, N. Ceausescu, in the current international situation particular importance is assumed by the greatest possible strengthening of unity and solidarity among the fraternal countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism and their further cooperation on the world scene.

The course of our party's 26th Congress, principled and permeated with the idea of proletarian internationalism, and the summit talks of 4 June 1984 in Moscow open up broad prospects for the further development of Soviet-Romanian relations and opportunities for deepening friendship and combat collaboration between our armies.

Over the 40 years the army of socialist Romania has changed beyond recognition. Its organizational development, under the leadership of the RCP, as a new type of army drawing on rich Soviet experience, was a component part of all the socio-economic changes in the nation.

Qualitative changes inherent to the armed forces of all the Warsaw Pact countries are also characteristic for the Romanian Army. Under the leadership of the RCP, and due to the fraternal aid from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the Romanian Army has been turned into modern armed forces. It is armed with missile weapons, artillery systems and tanks, supersonic aircraft, combat ships and other equipment. It is manned with highly skilled specialists. More than 30 percent of the officers are graduates of the Military Academy and other higher schools. Some 75 percent of the military experts are RCP members. Almost 90 percent of the army personnel are communists and members of the Communist Youth League. In the troops the movement has developed widely for the title "Advanced Serviceman" and "Advanced Subunit," for high indicators in military and political training and for an increased number of outstanding men, class specialists and rated athletes.

The traditions of combat friendship continue to develop between the armies of Romania, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Reciprocal visits of military delegations and ships, trips by commanders and political workers are organized to exchange experience. Romanian comrades participate in the activities of the Sports Committee of the Friendly Armies, in the military film festivals, in various practical scientific conferences as well as in meetings to exchange experience.

In congratulating their Romanian friends on the 40th anniversary of the liberation from the Nazi yoke and the 40th anniversary of the Romanian Army, the Soviet military wish them success in military and political training and in improving military skills for the good of strengthening the defense capabilities of their nation and the states in the Warsaw Pact which for almost 30 years now has steadily protected the historic victories of our people who comprise the fraternal socialist commonwealth.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION, ARMY NOTED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 84 pp 84-87

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent Yu. Sumbatyan:
"Achievements of Struggle and Creation; On the 10th Anniversary of the National-Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia"]

[Excerpts] On 12 September 1974, a Volkswagen escorted by military vehicles left the gates of the Imperial Palace in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. Making its way slowly through the heavy crowd, the column turned onto an avenue and in picking up speed, headed to the barracks of the 4th Army Division. In the rear seat between two persons in military uniforms sat dejectedly the now former Emperor Haile Selassie I, the "King of Kings" (this is how he was styled by himself and his supporters). He had left his residence once and for all....

Then, 10 years ago, the feudal-monarchical regime was overthrown by the Ethiopian Armed Forces with the broad support of the masses of people. It was an antimonarchical and antifeudal revolution which fundamentally altered the political and social appearance of the nation. On the ruins of the old medieval society there arose a new Ethiopia which set out on a path of democratic changes in all areas.

The revolution in Ethiopia was headed by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) which consisted of a group of young officers, predominantly of middle and lower rank. They followed antifeudal and antiimperialist positions. The PMAC in December 1974 proclaimed an extensive socioeconomic and political program which opened up new horizons of development for the country along a path of social progress. In the economic area it planned the nationalizing of the basic means of production and the instituting of state control over the leading enterprises and industrial development.

In the political area the PMAC planned to establish a progressive political party which conformed to the "socialist orientation of Ethiopia." Finally, in the foreign policy area, the military government set a course aimed at fighting against imperialism and colonialism and at decisive resistance to any imperialist maneuvers and intrigues and attempts to intervene into internal affairs.

The military-revolutionary government of Ethiopia, along with protecting progressive victories from internal counterrevolution and external enemies, from the very first days of the revolution took an active part in state construction.

In recent years throughout the nation associations of peasants and urban residents have been formed and these gradually have begun to carry out the role of grass-roots bodies of local power. Particular attention has been given to the organizing of the peasant associations, as the peasantry still comprises an absolute majority of the population. The present associations decide such questions as procurement and marketing of grain and other agricultural products, the monitoring of their prices, the distribution of fertilizers, varietal seed and the introduction of new progressive farming methods. They give great attention to political indoctrination in the countryside and fight against the vestiges of feudalism and nationalism.

Characteristic features of the new in Ethiopia are the associations of urban residents or "kebele." Their members belong to different urban social strata. But they all take an active part in the antifeudal, antiimperialist struggle. On the basis of the "kebele" movement, central bodies of urban self-government are being formed. Born out of the revolutionary creativity of the masses, the local bodies in Ethiopia--the peasant and urban associations--compr the basis of the future people's democratic state and under the condition serve as an effective form for involving the masses of people in governing the state.

The policy of deepening the social content of the revolution and strengthening the socialist orientation posed for the leaders of the PMAC the question of establishing a vanguard worker party. Considering the actual situation in the nation and the exacerbation of the class struggle, it was decided as a first step in this direction to organize the Commission for Organizing a Workers Party of Ethiopia (COWPE) headed by the PMAC Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam.

In summing up the results of the commission, the newspaper ETHIOPIAN HERALD wrote: "The establishing of COWPE was a historical point on the path of the revolutionary development of our country. The commission has done enormous work to disseminate Marxist-Leninist knowledge among the broad masses. Under its leadership the ranks of the social organizations have been significantly strengthened. As a result, conditions have been prepared for organizing a vanguard party of the working class. Only such a party, in being guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, can lead the construction of the bases of a socialist society in Ethiopia." There are plans to hold the party's constituent congress in the near future.

The enemies of the Ethiopian revolution in every possible way are endeavoring to impede its development and prevent the birth of a vanguard party in the country. However, all attempts to destabilize the revolutionary regime are doomed to failure. Broad strata of the population have been involved in the process of social changes and through various mass social organizations they take an active part in building a new life. Here, along with the associations of peasants and urban residents, we must also mention the trade unions. These are a mass organization of nationwide scale. The All-Ethiopian Trade Unions (AETU) play an important role in the development of the national economy, in raising the economy and defending the revolutionary victories. They have carried out great work aimed at increasing the political awareness and general educational level of the working class. They also are to become one of the main bases for organizing the vanguard party.

In the system of public organizations a significant place is held by the association of youth of revolutionary Ethiopia (AYRE) which has 4 million persons in its ranks. The AYRE members, being a reserve of the vanguard party, have made a substantial contribution to the development of the national economy, they initiate labor campaigns and participate in eliminating illiteracy and disseminating fundamentals of scientific socialism among the broad masses of the people.

The involving of women in the revolutionary process has occurred by establishing various women's associations in the villages, towns, rayons and later in the provinces. In 1980, they were all brought together in the Association of Women of Revolutionary Ethiopia (AWRE) and this has 5 million activists in its ranks, that is, approximately one-half the female population of the nation.

The Ethiopian Army holds a special place in the carrying out of the revolution as well as in strengthening and defending its victories. It played the crucial role in overthrowing the feudal-monarchical regime. It has had the difficult task of defending the revolution from internal and external pro-imperialist reactionary forces. From the very first days of the revolution, the people immediately supported the actions of the military. The Ethiopian Army became a mechanism for the development and defense of the revolution reflecting the will of the working masses in the city and countryside.

The moving of the army into the forefront of political life under the conditions of the absence of a single political party in the country led to the concentrating of state power in the hands of the military revolutionary democrats. In their activities they began to rely actively on at first the committees for the defense of the revolution established by the workers and later on the urban and peasant associations. The close link between the army and the people in the course of the revolution provided an opportunity for the PMAC to organize a people's militia in the nation in addition to regular units.

The new Ethiopian Army arose on the basis of the progressive nucleus of professional military men and armed worker and peasant detachments. It has become an important revolutionary force guarding the progressive victories of the nation. Along with its basic function of protecting the revolution against internal and external enemies, the National Ethiopian Army from the very outset took an active part in national economic construction. It built roads in inaccessible remote areas and helped the populus which was suffering from an extended drought in delivering and distributing food. Along with students, white collar personnel and school teachers, officers and soldiers combated illiteracy and sickness and helped to carry out progressive sociodemocratic changes.

After the defeat of the Somali Army which had invaded Ogaden Province and the local separatists in Eritrea, the Ethiopian soldiers provided great help to the local population in rebuilding the destroyed economy. They conducted political indoctrination among the broad working masses and explained the goals and tasks of the Ethiopian revolution and its policy on the nationality question. All of this has made it possible for the previously suppressed population of the liberated countries to successfully build a new society along with all the Ethiopian people. The heroic people of Ethiopia, with the fraternal international support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, have held

out in the clash against imperialism and the reaction, they thwarted the plans to break up the country and protected the revolution.

On the international scene, Socialist Ethiopia conducts an antiimperialist, anticolonial policy and works actively to strengthen peace and international security, to support the national liberation struggle of peoples and strengthen African unity. In 1983, M. H. Mariam was elected the chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist commonwealth countries are providing all-round support for the Ethiopian revolution and view it as a major component part of the world revolutionary process. Ethiopian collaboration with the socialist nations is carried out both within CEMA and on a bilateral basis. With Soviet aid more than 40 economic projects are being built here, including a first for Ethiopian industry, an oil refinery, as well as a polytechnical institute and other projects which have already been erected while cement and tractor-assembly plants, a hydropower plant, and a number of agricultural projects are in the process of construction. Soviet geologists have helped in exploring for gold, gas, oil and other Ethiopian natural riches. Political and cultural ties between our countries are broadening.

In speaking in March 1984 at a dinner in the Great Kremlin Palace in honor of the Chairman of the PMAC and COWPE, M. H. Mariam, Comrade K. U. Chernenko in his speech pointed out: "There are old friendly ties between our peoples. But only after the victory of the Ethiopian revolution, the 10th anniversary of which will be celebrated this year, have these relations truly flourished and shine with new facets. They have been firmly strengthened by our Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration."

The Ethiopian Armed Forces and workers are fully determined to defend the victories of the revolution and the independence of their ancient and young country which is living through its rebirth.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

OFFICER'S PRIVATE ENTERPRISE INTERRUPTS AVIATION TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 84 pp 45-59

[Article by Maj A. Golda, correspondent of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL "What Connivance Leads To; Follow-Up of a Letter"]

[Text] The arrival of a correspondent at the training air regiment X was no surprise. In truth, the unit commander had voiced something like perplexity as it was again the "Sushkov person." Was it essential to stir up the past and an end had to be put to this story.

I was acquainted with the party commission documents in the political section and the details of the "Sushkov case" were described to me. And each time I was led to believe that what had happened had been analyzed and conclusions had been drawn. The unseemly actions of the officer had been properly assessed. Now flight training for the officer candidates was going on normally. In a word, the unit commander emphasized with me in the conversation, a normal training process had been instituted. And for these reasons, it seemed to him, it was more than strange for Maj V. Zhuk to turn to the editors as it was with the major's letter that I came to the garrison.

But there is wisdom in the saying that we sometimes see the same things differently. Hence, let us first look impartially at what had alarmed the letter's author.

Maj Zhuk had written about flagrant violations by the regimental chief of staff, the CPSU member, Lt Col V. Sushkov and of instances of his deviations from the prescribed requirements and violations of an order. Here he also pointed out that he, the author of the letter, had not kept quiet about this and had reported it. But his alarms were essentially disregarded. Although Sushkov had suffered a party reprimand, he still continued to play the wrongly injured and endeavored to play down his guilt. Why, asked Maj Zhuk, did a person who had pretty well spoiled his reputation brag in front of the communists of his infallibility and speculate on their ignorance? Possibly because the judgment of his actions had been made in bypassing the party organization or party commission? Or perhaps it might be that he had gotten away with everything and responsibility for the arbitrary, illegal actions had been nullified?

We went to find the answers to these questions.

As soon as Officer Sushkov arrived for service in the unit, he immediately set to work, trying to prove himself and establish himself in the new position. Certainly this is completely understandable and justified. In truth, good deeds are required for a good reputation. But who would find them bad if they objectively brought the desired changes? The former regimental commander, Officer V. Bedarev said, for example, about this: "With Sushkov's arrival, they began to notice changes for the better. The logistical base began to improve, repairs were started on the training building and work was initiated to improve the military camp."

Actually the energeticness and initiative of the chief of staff made an impression. Something had been built, something had been repaired, something had been put up. Certainly everyone realized that the work required people. However, no one gave it a second thought as to what they were using to build, where the construction materials were coming from and, finally, the money. But the mysterious, as they say, always becomes clear. And it became clear here, too.

The men began to notice that the soldiers and sergeants assigned for jobs within the garrison were often sent by Sushkov, in violation of the order established by the appropriate instructions, to the enterprises. He explained it simply by saying that you realize that we need building materials, paint and plastic... hence work on the outside is indispensable.

How did his superiors view such entrepreneurship? They appeared not to notice it. But suddenly next to the training building a well-built private garage went up and frequently Officer Ye. Kosarev, Sr WO ["praporshchik"] V. Gubskiy and other servicemen could be seen building this. And they closed their eyes to this.

Sushkov viewed the tolerance shown him in his own way. He decided that everything was permitted to him. Here is what, for example, the deputy regimental commander for the aviation engineer service, Lt Col V. Ovechenko, had to say.

Ovechenko arrived one day for flights, as always, with just one desire that nothing interfere in carrying out the schedule. The weathermen had promised good weather, the equipment was ready and the flight shifts had been scheduled down to the minute. In heading to the engineer command post, the officer saw the officer candidates. They were talking in a lively manner, clearly feeling satisfaction from the forthcoming full combat training day. Certainly the flights were always a stirring event, even if a man was not a novice in flying.

As soon as Ovechenko entered the engineer command post there was bad news. The second squadron (it was supporting the flights) had not arrived at full strength. Several mechanics were missing. And you cannot assign one specialist to two planes. The instructions protect flight safety. Any, even an insignificant violation of these are inadmissible as it might mean an accident.

The officer reported to the commander on what had occurred. The flights were held up. It became clear why many specialists were absent. It turned out that all of them, upon instructions of the chief of staff, Lt Col V. Sushkov, had been sent out to various jobs. The soldiers were urgently summoned to the airfield. A good deal of time passed before the flight shift set to work.

A delay in the flights due to someone's inefficiency or negligence is an extraordinary event. And this was how it was viewed, completely rightly, in the regiment. A number of officials were punished. But at that time many wondered why had the blame passed over one of the guiltiest parties in what had happened, Sushkov.

Talks started and idle rumors flew about. The men remembered other instances when Sushkov had been forgiven for his sins. And at that time selfishness, conceit and arbitrariness appeared all the more clearly in the communist's conduct. Those around who began to grumble about the permissiveness shown to the officer fell into bad graces while those who viewed his conduct as proper received favor. A majority maintained silence taking heed equally of the good and the bad.

But still there was a man who loudly condemned Sushkov's work style and who stated that this communist officer had begun to abuse his official position. He was Maj V. Zhuk. In speaking at a report-election party meeting of the unit headquarters, he proposed that the CPSU member Sushkov be held responsible to the party for official oversights and violating the requirements of the Party By-Laws.

This was an alarm. Above all, for the unit commander, the chief of the political section and the secretary of the headquarters party organization. One might think that the communist leaders would voice their principled opinion on the events which had received general publicizing. All the more as they spoke at the meeting. But what did they speak about? About a great deal: about how not all the party members were setting an example in training and service and in conduct, that not every man was making a strong contribution to the strengthening of discipline and that fewer demands were placed against the violators of the requirements of the party By-Laws. But then the question arises: didn't CPSU member Sushkov fall into this category of unseemly actions and deeds? If this was not so, then it would be reasonable to repudiate the slander and restore the truth. But neither the commander nor the chief of the political section said a word about the comments of Maj Zhuk. And obviously many began to wonder if in combating shortcomings one should draw the "fire" on oneself? Wasn't it better to keep a low profile? And this incidentally, as was admitted by the deputy secretary of the unit headquarters party bureau, Maj I. Sergeyev, was how some communists began to behave. The men began to compromise with what should not be passed over in silence and against what intolerance must be shown. In a word, the moral costs of all that had happened here began to make themselves felt.

In skipping ahead we should say that in a talk to the unit's communists, the chief of the school's political section also pointed to the negative consequences of Sushkov's story for the moral atmosphere in the collective. However, in listening to his words, one could not help but wonder if this were the case, then why not also say something about the person who wanted to warn of Sushkov's very deviation from established order and, consequently, the moral costs which this inevitably entailed? It should be openly said that the CPSU member, Maj Zhuk, had acted in a party manner and had not tolerated shortcomings, and then the other communists would also have been less tolerant of them. But why take up this when even the leaders felt it possible to overlook the "Sushkov affair"

at the party conference. Precisely after this Maj Zhuk was forced to turn to the party commission under the regimental political section.

A party investigation was set. The facts of Sushkov's abuse of his position were confirmed. A party reprimand was handed down to the CPSU member. Seemingly everything was correct from the formal standpoint: evil had been punished and virtue triumphed. But the problem was that the strange conduct of the same Sushkov as before impeded the triumph of virtue. He distorted the truth about himself and endeavored to depict black as white thereby putting himself in the clear while the party punishment was portrayed as nothing more than a misunderstanding. With good reason the CPSU members A. Stryganov and V. Sikorskiy say that Sushkov before the party commission behaved as if he were not the defendant but rather those who were calling him to task.

And at present Sushkov continues to assert that he was not only obliging himself but also acting for the sake of common interests. Circumstances demanded that he strike deals with essential persons in order to secure things and create the training facilities. Why was he considered to bear the blame for all the misfortunes?

"The situation so developed," "life necessitated," "I was working not for myself".... No, no one can hide behind these expressions like a screen. Yes, a situation for any person, particularly a military one, is a factor which cannot be disregarded. A difficult situation develops and the soldier carries out the task without sparing any effort. A situation dictates decisive actions, entrepreneurship, initiative and boldness. But precisely a sense of duty and responsibility for the assigned job predetermine the nature of a person's actions and deeds and do not allow him to violate the requirements of the regulations or sin against moral principles.

A problem of moral choice confronted Sushkov. One can hardly even assume that he did not know that he would be acting contrary to the established rules and standards of party life. Undoubtedly he did know this. He knew that nothing could justify his action. Was the communist ultimately thinking about his deeds? Rather about his own interests. Ambition strengthened other feelings in him. It was flattering to hear that Sushkov had done this, this was Sushkov's accomplishment and Sushkov was moving things forward....

We should also mention one other important aspect. What completely convinced Sushkov of his impunity.

Once the question arose of how to lay flooring in one of the rooms. Flooring is flooring. But how to purchase it, where could the money come from? Then the regimental commander, in violation of the established procedures, permitted the chief of staff to use soldiers in jobs in order to acquire money. This further unleashed Sushkov's hands and the "moral brake" was taken off his incorrect actions.

It was unpleasant for the unit commander to recall what had happened. But at that time, he felt that he was acting "for the good of things." "Don't you see," explained the officer, "that we proceeded thus in the interests of the matter, in exceptional cases." But facts also show that these instances were

far from exceptional. Although it is certainly clear that an order is not a harmless rule to which one can make exceptions.

"Our life is full of compromises," was the opinion I heard here from the comrades who were very keen that their actions seem at least a little more seemly and justified. But does a CPSU member have the right to strike a deal with his party conscience? Precisely from such connivance stretches a thread to a whole series of failures and major shortcomings. Is it not this thread, in particular, which leads us to such an abnormal phenomenon still encountered in the unit as the failure of individual officials to report for exercises and flights and a desire of some to say in justification that it is better for the unit to generally avoid flight work and seek an easier job.

I recall my conversations with the workers of the political section and the communists of the regimental headquarters and I cannot help but note their general concern for the state of party work in the main area, flight support, and their concern for the effectiveness of the party measures. Certainly there are grounds for this. In summing up the results for the winter training period, a senior chief pointed out that in the unit there had been shortcomings in carrying out the tasks of flight training and in ensuring flight safety while individual servicemen had violated military discipline. He emphasized that certain party organizations had lessened their influence on many aspects of the collective's life. A special rebuke was addressed to the party organization of the regimental headquarters where Sushkov was a member. True enough, the meetings and sessions of the bureau were held regularly here. But, upon the admission of the communists themselves, it was rare that a principled discussion evolved around the most crucial problems or around what impeded the regimental staff from consistently and steadily establishing strict prescribed order in the subunits and to work truly for effectiveness of the training process and for increasing the personal contribution of each staff officer to combat readiness and his responsibility for the moral consequences of his actions. For example, the party organization irregularly hears reports by party members and candidate members on their carrying out of their party and official duties or how they are working in the subunits. Thus, over the last 18 months, none of the communists has reported to his comrades on how he has carried out the CPSU By-Laws or what work he has done in the assigned area.

Recently, the question of the work style of a communist officer from the headquarters not a single time either at a meeting or at a session of the party bureau. But the need for this, it is recognized in the regiment, has been and remains.

Incidentally, concern for the state of affairs in the unit headquarters and alarm over the state of work of its party organization have also been shared in the political section. In conversation officers from the political section willingly listed these and other shortcomings. But who first, one might wonder, should be concerned for establishing in the headquarters party organization a situation of exactingness and a healthy moral atmosphere if not the political section? Who, if not it, is to teach the party aktiv and all the communists principledness, to teach them in everything to strictly adhere to the standards of party life?

As they say, the political section was not always up to snuff in all of this. For example, take the fact of holding CPSU member Sushkov responsible to the party. As is known, according to the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, the question of the misdeed by this communist should be reviewed by the primary party organization. Precisely here is where the communists best know his shortcomings and merits and here they could most profoundly and correctly assess the flaws in the work of the CPSU member and place true party demands on him. Here also they could have touched such a facet in the relations of two communists--Sushkov and Zhuk--as the prejudice shown by the chief of staff. This was expressed in the fact, for example, that Sushkov, without going into the essence of what happened, punished Officer Zhuk. And without stating the reprimand, he made an entry of this in Zhuk's service file. This also led to moral losses.

Connivance in matters large and small is always fraught with serious consequences. And the sentence for it is always to nip in the bud those factors which cause a deviation from our standards of party life and laws of military service.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

BOOK REVIEW: 'THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 84 pp 88-90

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences M. Malyukovskiy and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Col V. Tokarev of the book "Natsional'nodemokraticheskaya revolyutsiya i armiya" by Z. Sh. Gafurov, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 214 pages, 1 ruble 20 kopecks]

[Text] The military questions of the national-democratic revolution and primarily the questions of establishing its military organization and regular armed forces under present-day conditions have assumed particular pertinence. This is related primarily to the fact that now a serious danger is threatening the national-democratic revolutions and their main victory, the socialist-oriented states. This danger derives both from outside, from the imperialist forces, as well as from the internal counterrevolution. The "crusade" initiated by imperialism, primarily American, against communism is aimed also against the progressive movements and regimes in the zone of the national liberation struggle. This can be seen from the actions of U.S. imperialism in Central America, the Near East, the South of Africa and in other regions of the world. Under these conditions, the military questions relating directly to the organization and development of the armed forces of the national-democratic revolution have assumed not only theoretical but also practical significance.

The monograph [reviewed here] by Z. Gafurov which was published by Izdatel'stvo Nauka is devoted to investigating the sociopolitical aspects of national military organizational development in the socialist-oriented states. On the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, it generalizes the experience of the organizational development of the national armed forces as the main weapon for defending the victories of the national-democratic revolution. The problems of the rise of armies in the young progressive Asian and African states, the general and specific principles of their organizational development, development stages, class essence as well as domestic and external functions are viewed by the author in an organic link with the revolutionary process and with the social and political struggle characteristic for the liberated peoples.

Z. Gafurov rightly starts an integrated investigation of the sociopolitical aspect of armies in the socialist oriented states by showing the process of their birth, establishment and development. The first chapter of the book is devoted precisely to this methodologically important question. It examines such

important questions on the scientific and cognitive level as the ways for the development of armies in the progressive Asian and African states, their objective bases and main stages of development.

Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the dependence of the nature of a military organization upon the country's social and state system, the author analyzes the objective socioeconomic, political and ideological bases for the rise and development of armies in the young socialist-oriented states. Here consideration is given to the recent incorporation of the economy of these states in the capitalist world economic system and this has told negatively on the process of the forming of their military institutions.

Of great interest are the pages devoted to the technical organizational aspect of the development of the armed forces. In drawing on recent foreign statistical data, including that of the London Institute for Strategic Studies in 1978-1983 and broadly employing the method of comparative analysis, the author examines in detail the military-technical aspect of the organizational development of the national armed forces, and shows command and control, organizational structure, size, manning system, training of the personnel and the procedures of service. These and other military questions are viewed through the prism of the sociopolitical problems of establishing and developing the young developing states.

The book's second chapter is devoted to an elucidation and analysis of the general development traits of progressive armies in the liberated countries. In comparing them with the armies of other Afro-Asian states which are similar in terms of original conditions but which have chosen a different path of development, the author defines both the general and particular traits of the armed forces in the socialist-oriented states.

Such a comparison makes it possible for Z. Gafurov to view anticolonialism as a common trait in virtually all the armies of the developing nations and to illustrate this by convincing examples from the life and combat activities of the armies in the Afro-Asian states. As for the struggle against neocolonialism, it, as a general trait, is inherent only to the armies of the socialist-oriented states.

The monograph creatively and concretely resolves the question of antiimperialism as the basic trait of the armies of developing countries. The author's idea is that not all "Third World" armies are against the aggregate of main, determining aspects of imperialism. While they all reject colonialism and colonial forms of exploitation, far from all of them are against imperialism as a development stage of capitalism or the capitalist form of exploitation. In the study this is reinforced by an analysis of the positions held by the ruling circles of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco and Jordan in the Arab-Israeli wars, the Lebanese events, and the position of Zaire and certain other African states in the concluding stage of the liberation war in Angola.

In describing the examined armies, an important place is given to the national and ethnic aspect of their development. The national aspect, in being secondary in relation to the class one on the general historical level, is not a subordinate one when it is a question of the national and, particularly, the military

institutions of the liberated countries. In individual instances this comes to the forefront. Where class contradictions have not become sufficiently apparent, where class differentiation in a society has not been clearly established, and where the colonial or neocolonial yoke primarily has suppressed and does suppress everyone and everything, the national question comes to the forefront. The problem of nationalism in the developing countries, its contradictory essence, dual role and influence on the armed forces is examined in this context.

We must particularly point out that these complex theoretical questions are resolved by the author on the basis of studying and generalizing documents and real facts relating to the military organizational development in the nations of the Arab East and other regions as well as the life and military activities of their armies.

The book's third chapter examines the specific features of the armies in the socialist-oriented states and the principles of their organizational development. In assessing the sociopolitical nature of the examined armies, the author, in siding with a number of Soviet researchers, defines this as revolutionary-democratic or national-democratic and views these terms as synonyms. However more adequate is the term "revolutionary-democratic," since such an army is called upon to defend a new type of society which arose in the struggle against imperialism. Moreover, the essence of the socialist-oriented state in the book is defined quite correctly as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the working people. The armed forces must also be precisely a tool of this state. Where Z. Gafurov argues against those who consider the national bourgeoisie to be a component element of the ruling class forces exercising revolutionary-democratic power in the state as well as those who consider antifeudalism as a specific trait of the designated armies, his arguments are rather persuasive.

The monograph resolves the question of the antiimperialism of the armies in the socialist-oriented states more profoundly than the existing Soviet literature on this question. The antiimperialism of these armies, as the author shows, here develops into anticapitalism and merges with it, representing that real principle which serves as the main, practical base for the coinciding of the domestic and foreign functions of such an army. For imperialism in the given instance acts not so much against the national independence of the country as against its socialist choice. The purpose of the army in a socialist-oriented state is to protect the revolutionary-democratic system and its victories by the armed suppression of forces hostile to it. Proceeding from this, the author derives the domestic and foreign functions of the army.

The chapter resolves the complex question of the development patterns of the armed forces in the young independent states on a level of recent theoretical ideas. The author introduces his own clarifications into the formulation of these patterns. One can agree with them, bearing in mind, however, that great work still remains to be done in this area.

The informative and interestingly written book of Z. Gafurov is not devoid of individual shortcomings. In particular, the title of the monograph presupposes a statement in the first part of it, even briefly, of the basic provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory on the national democratic revolution. However, this

has not been done. For example, one cannot consider as successful the thesis of identifying the armies of different historical types, even if it is a question here of their general generic features. Just five pages in the book have been devoted to such an important aspect in the functioning of the studied armies as their active involvement in carrying out national economic, social and cultural tasks. The latter, as is known, has given certain bourgeois researchers grounds to speak even about the dual function of the army in the liberated countries, that is, military and civilian. Finally, it could be pointed out that the use of the experience of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces in a book on the founding of progressive armies should have been more widely analyzed. This is all the more important now, when the aggressive policy of imperialism aimed at preparing for a new world war and at achieving military supremacy over the USSR and its allies is being opposed by the united position of the world socialist commonwealth and the national liberation movement.

Moreover, the author has not always succeeded in handling the abundant material. This has led in certain sections of the monograph to a fragmentary approach in laying out the fundamental theses of the examined questions and to a superficial analysis of individual facts.

As a whole, though, the monograph, in being written on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and drawing extensively on vast original material as well as the author's personal experience, makes it possible to understand more profoundly the basic trends in the development of armies in the socialist-oriented countries and the difficulty of the problems of military organizational development being resolved in these countries. There is every reason to view the given book as a useful and necessary work which represents a new stage of understanding the processes which are still not sufficiently studied and differ in their political sense related to the organizational development of the armies in the liberated Asian and African countries which have proclaimed socialist development goals.

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WARSAW PACT

REPORT ON 'SHIELD-84' TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Col V. Moroz and Lt Col A. Polyakov: "In Close Coordination"]

[Text] The active operations of the sides began yesterday on exercise "Shield-84".

The exercise is being directed by the Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Army General M. Dzur. The course of the exercise is being observed by party and government leaders of the Czechoslovak SSR, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, and leaders of military delegations from the fraternal socialist countries. The commander of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, and the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Army General A. I. Gribkov, are also here.

Our special correspondents tell about the development of events in the training battles.

It is quiet over the range. It is unstable, ready to explode at any moment. The "West" and the "East"--this is what the troops of the opposing sides are called--are ready for battle. The "West" succeeded in digging in on an advantageous line. The strong points of the first-echelon companies are on the hills directly in front of us.

The combat operations did not begin here, but further to the east. The "West" suddenly attacked subunits of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The battalion under the command of Senior Lieutenant F. Dvorzhachek and other subunits staunchly held the occupied positions, wearing the "enemy" down. Skillfully directing the fire of their subordinates and employing maneuver artfully were Lieutenants M. Marchik and I. Kozhant. The turning point in the course of the intense battle set in after the "West" counterattacked Soviet and Hungarian subunits which had moved up from the rear.

The tanks and infantry combat vehicles of one of the regiments from the Irkutsko-Pinsk Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet rushed to meet the "enemy" in an armored avalanche.

Operating on this exercise is a regiment of a division on the roster of one of whose companies Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant V. Yesaulenko, a commander of a rifle company who displayed unparalleled courage in a battle at Rostov, is enrolled forever. It is operating in the Guards manner. High skill in the training battle was demonstrated by motorized riflemen of the battalion under the command of Guards Major D. Alekseyev and by the tankmen of companies led into the assault by Guards Senior Lieutenants A. Spirin and P. Dolotov. They coordinated clearly with subunits of the Hungarian People's Army where the battalion commander, Senior Lieutenant I. Bundich, and company commanders Lieutenants Ch. Bog'yashovski, Sh. Sidali, and Sh. Kolosho were distinguished by tactical skill.

Suffering losses and having used their reserves, the "West" was forced to assume the defensive. On a line where four "enemy" company strong points had been scouted before us. They were covered by minefields. The defenders have a large quantity of antitank weapons, use aviation actively, and strive to hamper the "East's" actions by the employment of electronic jamming. The regrouping of troops and weapons was required for the "East" to continue the attack. The "enemy" defense would be broken through by units of the Soviet and Polish Armies supported by Czech aviators and artillerymen. The training battle flares up in the area where men of the 38th and 1st Guards Armies fought the Hitlerites heroically during the years of the Great Patriotic War, liberating the Moravska-Ostrava industrial zone. They were supported from the south by units of the 18th Army.

Now, four decades later, the sons and grandsons of the frontline fighters and the direct heirs to their combat glory are improving their combat skill here.

Preparations for the attack are being completed on the attack positions. The sides are conducting intensive reconnaissance. Reconnaissance aircraft sweep by above the area of operations as silvery arrows. The information obtained by the Soviet and Czech fliers discloses the situation in the depth of the "West's" defense more and more completely. They have considerable forces available. The breakthrough of such a saturated and strong defense is possible only with the reliable destruction of the "enemy" by fire.

The quiet of the range is broken by the roar of gun salvos. The fire support of the troops' moving out to the line of departure begins. The "East's" artillery battalions are conducting fire at the "enemy's" command-observation posts and at the positions of his artillery and antiaircraft batteries.

Aviation is launching crushing strikes against the strong points. The Czech airplanes are tearing the air asunder with their turbines at the very ground. They are striking the "West's" ground command posts.

At the same time, without entering the zone of the "enemy's" effective antiaircraft fire helicopter gunships from the Soviet squadron are destroying armored targets with rockets. They are replaced by bombers.

The increase in the force of the fire tells of the start of the direct fire support of the attack. The troops which are moving out have already deployed into platoon columns.

The antiaircraftmen stop the "West's" attempts to hamper the moving out of the "East's" battalions by air strikes. Rockets rush toward the ruby-colored glow-worms which, simulating "enemy" airplanes, fly by as flashes above the battlefield. Smoky winding traces intersect in various places....

Just as formerly, the fire of the "East's" artillery batteries is combined with airplane-helicopter strikes. Bombs are dropped on targets and the helicopters strike the company strong points with free rockets and point targets with guided missiles. Tanks which have been moved up for direct fire open fire from cover. The last artillery attack is against the FEBA [forward edge of the battle area]. Its density is maximum.

Obstacle-clearing groups move out ahead. Their mission is to prepare passages in the minefields. Elongated charges take off upward as giant snakes, carried away by rocket motors; they fall, cutting the minefield to its entire depth and explode in crimson puffs of smoke. Signal lights which designate the lines of the passages blaze up brightly here.

The smoke of the explosions mixes with the dust raised by the tracks of the combat vehicles. It seems as though twilight is setting in in the middle of the day.

The Soviet and Polish motorized riflemen dismount on the march, deploying into a skirmish line. They do not lag behind the tanks. The infantry combat vehicles are leapfrogging, utilizing folds in the terrain and natural masks, and the antiaircraft sections are vigilantly watching the air.

The motorized riflemen of a Soviet regiment attack the "enemy" on the right flank. At the tip of the attack is the battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V. Grushko. A high level of coordination is shown by the personnel of the company commanded by Captain Yu. Sedov. Young platoon leaders Lieutenants I. Leonov and V. Gavrilenko control fire confidently.

The Polish men are attacking on the left in a single battle line with our motorized riflemen. At the limiting point of the flanks is the battalion under the command of Captain R. Smochinski. It is an excellently trained subunit. The battalion commander received his military rank ahead of schedule twice and has been awarded a state award. The badge of excellent commander is also on the breast of Lieutenant V. Valavgo. He commands the best company in the regiment. Lieutenant T. Zhmuda displays tactical maturity and high organizational abilities on the exercise.

The tanks approach the first trench, and the rumble of the explosions of hand grenades is heard at once. Batteries of the self-propelled artillery mounts of the Czechoslovak People's Army occupy unprepared firing positions from the march in order to increase the depth of the "enemy's" destruction by fire. Supporting the attack, the self-propelled artillery mounts strike in a salvo. The "East's" aviation launches bomb and rocket strikes against the strong points of the defender's second-echelon companies.

The battle rolls farther and farther away. The clearance lights of the tanks and infantry combat vehicles are barely distinguishable by now in the smoky shroud. Groups of fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships are directing their strikes against distant areas, hampering the "enemy" in the maneuvering of his reserves.

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CSO: 1801/9

WARSAW PACT

WARSAW PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 27 November 1984 carries on page one a 20-word notice that the regular session of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers' Committee is to take place in Budapest, Hungary during December 1984. No specific date or list of participants is given.

CSO: 1801/81

ARMED FORCES

COMMENTS ON IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Deryugin: "We Swear Allegiance To The Fatherland"]

[Text] Among the great number of professions available to a young man is one that he must master. This is the profession of defender of the Fatherland. Every spring and fall thousands and thousands of young people after donning the military uniform stand with rifle in hand and swear their allegiance to the Fatherland, the people and the achievements of socialism. And during this same time yesterday's school children, students, workers and kolkhoz farmers get their notices from their voyenkomats [military registration and enlistment offices] calling them up to active service.

They are not born soldiers. But we are obliged to remember the warning words of V.I. Lenin who said, "The person who will forget the danger constantly threatening us, a danger that will not stop while world imperialism exists, this person who will forget that will forget about our working republic". These are words from the revolutionary past and today they have not lost their deep meaning and resounding sharpness. They have something in common with what CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet K.U. Chernenko said in his speech several days ago at the anniversary plenum of the USSR Writers Union. "The grim truth about today's international situation is that unfortunately the nuclear threat is great. You cannot hide from it and laugh it off. We must actively and purposefully fight against the nuclear threat and we are doing just that."

Under these conditions the defensive might of our state becomes a very important factor in the fight for peace. But defensive potential is more than a fast-developing economy, modern military equipment and weapons. It is also the unshakable patriotic spirit of the people and their constant readiness to rise up in defense of their Fatherland at any moment.

And the military-patriotic education of young people, the essence of which includes the single-minded formulation of high ideological, moral-political and psychological qualities in the Soviet people, qualities that are necessary for the armed defense of socialism's achievements, is called upon to play an invaluable role in this. Bourgeois ideology has not abandoned the hopes of making concentrated strikes aimed at undermining the heroic class consciousness of Soviet youth and weakening their patriotic spirit. Western Soviet

specialists, political scientists and sociologists of various ilks see as their final goal a personality model of Soviet man in which narrow-minded, consumer, private-ownership interests predominate. They are using every possible means to sow a mood of political complacency among Soviet young people and are stealthily putting in a hint of general class reconciliation.

We can be successful in cultivating a sharp vision of the existing military political situation in young people and especially in students only in cases where the educational process and the teaching of social disciplines more fully considers the sharpness of contemporary reality. Abstract pacifism is not a viable alternative to militarism and the preservation of peace is tied to reinforcing the defensive capability and assuming the highest military readiness.

We must take some lines from the Basic Trend in the General Education and Professional School Reform as a reference point. These lines state, "The foundation of student military-patriotic education must be training them for service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR, indoctrinating them with love for the Soviet Army, developing a lofty feeling both of pride for being a member of the socialist Fatherland and of constant readiness to defend it".

It is well known that the kernels of patriotism are introduced into the consciousness of young people not only by the family and the parents but also by the school teacher. He is a trusted social figure and to the rising generation he is a wise and good mentor who opens up the powerful forces of our ideas, moral values and all the spiritual riches of practical socialism. This is the real essence of his profession.

We remember the teachers of the initial post-war years. They entered the class auditoriums in faded field shirts smelling of gunpowder and in khaki tunics which, along with medal ribbon bars, had stripes denoting wounds. These were the people who personified their national feat in one's eyes. And regardless of the subject that these teachers conducted, be it history or mathematics, literature or biology, geography or physics, they considered it their duty to tell about the war, about the special closeness of friendship on the front, about boldness and courage and the fidelity to duty of those who had brought us the long-awaited Victory.

Now there are fewer and fewer veterans and the people behind the teacher's desk are basically those born after the war. We tell our children a lot about peace and this is right. The country's young citizens must know and understand our state's aspiration to avert the thermonuclear conflict which latter-day claimants to world supremacy want to incite. But nonetheless, it is important for today's teachers to be able to show young people what price we had to pay to attain that peace. To bring the very great moral sense of the words, "No one and nothing has been forgotten" to young people's consciousness so that every schoolboy realizes and feels with both his mind and his heart the essence of this truth which was engendered through the suffering of our people and arose in our much-suffered land and whose the roots go back to the graves of those who gave their lives for the future.

The school reform commits us to approach the course of basic military training very responsibly. It is during this training that students learn about the structure, goals and reasons for the Armed Forces and also about tactical, marksmanship and drill and ceremony training and military topography. You need not worry that this will influence the content of all a school's educational work and will promote the strengthening of conscious discipline in students, will develop a feeling of personal responsibility and promote increased interest in the military profession. Thus the academic process itself has enormous possibilities for developing heroic-patriotic consciousness in young people. We should frankly note that these capabilities are not always realized to the fullest degree.

School military instructors require special attention. Today more and more often young teachers are replacing veterans and in many schools former servicemen who have just removed their shoulder boards after their service tour are conducting basic military training. They have the military knowledge but at times still lack teaching experience. This is why it is important to direct experienced teachers to give them the required help and to transfer their own teaching skills to these new teachers.

It is certainly not necessary to interpret the forms and methods of military-patriotic education amassed by Soviet pedagogics. The teachers in schools, PTU's [vocational technical schools], technical schools and VUZ's [institutions of higher education] have a rich selection for showing creativity and initiative. These include the Red Pathfinders, detachments to aid veterans of war and labor and families of soldiers who perished, the All-Union "Orlenok" and "Zarnitsa" games, the All-Union march of young people to places of Soviet peoples' revolutionary, military and labor glory, the Komsomol "Letopis" Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" [Annals of the Great Patriotic War], the creation of museums and rooms of military glory, patronage of military memorials and meetings with war heroes. This list is not all inclusive. It is certainly not a question of the number and diversity of the form but rather of how much life, enthusiasm and instructor talent they have.

Comrade K.U. Chernenko at a recent forum of Soviet writers said, "Historical education has been and remains an important instrument for indoctrinating citizenship, Soviet patriotism and internationalism". Constant, lively contact with history and its makers cannot but impact on the development of personality and the formulation of a Marxist-Leninist view of the world. It has to influence the class perception of the laws of revolutionary struggle and the ability to build a clear discriminatory line between good and evil. The rusted-out cartridge that was found, the yellowed military photograph, the last note or letter written by a grandfather before an attack and the handful of earth from a battlefield are not only memorable exhibits for school and student museums. They will certainly find wholesome response in the spirit of young people and will compel them to look at reality and at themselves more intently.

Soviet patriotism is class patriotism and it is primarily this trait that is taking on special significance in our day. The stormy current of political events which are swiftly changing in the kaleidoscope of the international

panorama, the armed conflicts that are constantly blazing up in various corners of our planet and the excessively steep wave of anticommunism require that Soviet people have an indefatigable class maturity and this reinforces the necessity of indoctrinating a burning hatred for imperialism in young people.

The outstanding Soviet teacher V.A. Sukhomlinskiy calls this hatred of the enemy the guard of patriotic love. In its class expression this hatred has nothing in common with the general understanding of evil for it is directed against social evil which is the source of peoples' misfortune and is a potential source of the possibility of thermonuclear conflict.

The Leninist Komsomol has an enormous role in military-patriotic education and a CPSU Central Committee resolution on further improving party leadership of the Komsomol clearly and convincingly discusses this point.

Preparations for the celebration of victory over Hitlerite Fascism and Japanese Imperialism is opening new perspectives for military-patriotic education and a CPU Central Committee resolution adopted in connection with this anniversary noted a complex of measures for strengthening ideological indoctrination work and increasing the labor and political activity of all workers.

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ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL URGES OFFICERS TO DEMONSTRATE INITIATIVE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 84 p 1

[Editorial: "The Courage Of A Command Plan"]

[Text] Deep ideological conviction, selfless devotion to the Fatherland, high moral fighting qualities, mastery of advanced military scientific thought and understanding of the laws governing armed combat are the foundation for the growth of tactical skill in the Army and Navy leadership cadre and give them room to creatively seek and reach innovations in improving their art.

Powerful weapons, improved military equipment and mobile, fast-paced modern battle make great demands on the command activity at all its stages and most of all on the process of developing a decision. The plan plays a decisive role in this. While preparing for battle, every commander asks himself questions such as what methods and means will he use to defeat the opposing enemy. But only the person who boldly thinks on a grand scale and is prepared for justified risk, who actively uses his professional potential and the advanced experience of today's best commanders and the invaluable experience of the frontal years is able to find the answers leading to reliable success.

In his book "We Serve The Motherland and the Affairs of Communism", USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov noted, "Generally speaking, making a decision is always a complicated, creative process and is always a certain sort of step into the unknown. Every decision to some degree is accompanied by risk... However this risk is not some action taken at random in hopes of a favorable outcome to a battle or operation. On the contrary, it is the ability to detect hidden conditional factors and, after recognizing the enemy's course of reasoning, to forestall him and bind him to your own will."

During tactical training a tank battalion commanded by Major V. Ponomarenko got the mission of attacking an "enemy" fortified in an advantageous position. The battalion commander thoroughly evaluated the existing situation. "Enemy" forces were too strong to meet in open battle so what was needed was a surprise attack from an unexpected direction at the most unexpected moment. The officer made a bold, risky decision and decided to make a deep maneuver at night along terrain almost impassable for tanks. He organized a careful reconnaissance of the envelopment route and later special security for it. The "enemy" was taken by surprise and the battalion successfully completed its assigned mission.

This example is noteworthy because it shows the inseparable unity of a plan's boldness and the skill to carry it through. Indeed a commander's most unexpected, original plan can be carried out only when his subordinates are sufficiently prepared and trained to carry out the plan.

Unfortunately there are often still cases where the commander does not strive for the required initiative, tactical improvisation and a sharp plan during training and maneuvers, but instead prefers models that have been adjusted and developed, but have no real value in the specific situation.

In one of the training battles a submarine commanded by Captain 2nd Rank P. Volonets had to secretly cross the "enemy's" anti-submarine defense. Evaluating the existing situation and studying the final reconnaissance information and hydrometric bulletins, the submarine commander came to the conclusion that he would not be able to avoid detection by surface ships. True, he could have tried to penetrate undetected through an area where navigation was difficult, but the officer rejected the idea, fearing the risk. Nevertheless, this was the key to victory. Having chosen the passive course, the submariners were unable to avoid battle and were defeated.

Such shortcomings are the consequence not only of the commanders themselves not doing enough work but also of the atmosphere in which training takes place. It is also the result of the low level of demand from senior commanders and staffs whose foremost obligation is to create a situation during training which motivates commanders to strive for innovation and search for an original decision without which it would be impossible to complete the assigned missions successfully. Practice shows that training is still not being conducted everywhere up to the level of modern demand and conditions for completing combat training missions are being simplified without justification. Commanders sometimes only go through the motions with their subunits and this lowers the intensity of the training battle. Some senior commanders, in striving for total positive success at any price and wanting to avoid their subordinates making errors, at times deprive them of independence. And yet it is right in the training battle that a commander has the possibility of more fully displaying his professional qualities and of acquiring practical skills which make his development possible.

Exercises on terrain mock-ups and maps and command and staff training are good resources for developing boldness in command thinking. Here commanders feel more unfettered in developing plans while they shape a battle and they experiment, verifying their theoretical suppositions, and quickly correct the errors that come up so that later, after the necessary evaluation of the corrections by senior commanders, they are able to confirm the acquired experience in practice.

A commander's responsibility is to be able to defeat any enemy, but this is impossible without a bold, creative idea and without the ability to direct all of his subordinates' efforts into realizing his plan. "Shchit-84" convincingly confirms this. This ability comes through the constant improvement of commanders' tactical-operational training which is based on the growth of the general and military culture among officer cadre and on the development of

solid practical skills in organizing and conducting battle. The concern of senior commanders and staffs, political agencies and party organizations is to develop every possible condition for officer growth and to make them responsible for the quality of professional training.

Socialist competition has a great stimulating effect on the command activity in a training battle. It stimulates the competitiveness most of all in deciding the primary missions assigned to subunits, units and ships, including increasing combat readiness and acquiring combat skills. Competition also motivates commanders to a constant, creative search.

The boldness of a command plan is one of the most important conditions for victory in battle. And the higher the level of creative thought and the more they act with initiative in training battles, the higher the combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

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ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirokov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "In The Third Delivery"]

[Text] "What is going on with the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA delivery," Officer V. Shein asks indignantly. "Today is Sunday and the Friday edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will be delivered Monday. How many days in a row will that be? Four! Certainly one can get the news from other newspapers..."

Officers Yu. Komaretskiy and Yu. Lebedev also talked about the newspaper's poor delivery in Kamchatka. And they are undoubtedly correct. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is delivered to subscribers in Kamchatka in a really wretched manner. We have had to look into this issue time and time again under very diverse circumstances.

I will start at the beginning. As far back as three months ago N. Gornostay, chief of the Kamchatka Oblast Communications Administration, without a moment's hesitation answered my question on why KRASNAYA ZVEZDA arrives in Kamchatka and is delivered to subscribers so late. "Because your newspaper is not under controlled delivery. We also have newspapers such as PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA which are under controlled delivery. Moreover, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is printed in Khabarovsk and is therefore late..."

It turned out that in fact things were not like that at all. Where did N. Gornostay get the information that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was not under controlled delivery? Most likely he said it only to excuse himself. And where did he find out that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is printed late at Khabarovsk and because of that it is too late for the airplane which delivers the other newspapers, for example, PRAVDA, to Kamchatka? And literally the next day the delay in delivering KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was repeated. We had to quickly go to the department which handles airmail transportation. Dispatcher T. Kravchenko informed me that, "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had arrived at night and would be delivered to subscribers late. We will sort them according to mail department on the third shift, or to put it more clearly, during the last shift. There is nothing that can be done about it as there aren't enough people. And yes, we have PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA under special control."

What is this special control?

N. Gornostay, chief of the oblast communications department said, "Control is the same for all newspapers. They simply do not have time to sort them out. And yes, your newspaper is obviously late in Khabarovsk..."

I had to read all the delivery statistics for six months. The newspaper was often detained because of the transportation section. Then N. Gornostay said, "We try not to detain KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and we sort it out during the first shift..." Some months have passed since then and almost nothing has changed for the better. It is Monday, 27 August and the 25 August issue is still not in. I dropped by the 24th Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka Communications Department. Assistant chief of the mail department Z. Yakimenko said, "The 25 August issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA arrived here today and will be delivered to subscribers on the 28th. We cannot do it today as there is no postman. This is summer vacation period."

It would seem that the time for poor newspaper delivery must finally come to an end, but it was nothing of the sort. For example, subscribers in Kamchatka had still not received the 31 August issue on the September 2. We again had to telephone the airmail transportation department and they informed us that, "Today, 2 September we sorted KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 31 August during the third shift. This means that the newspaper will get to subscribers on the fourth day." And this is the way it happened. On Monday, 3 September the mailman brought two issues at the same time.

The question that comes up is how long will the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA delivery to Kamchatka be treated so scandalously?

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ARMED FORCES

NEW VACATION BENEFITS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen A. Gashchuk: "To Tourist Bases--Using Preferential Permits"]

[Text] Beginning 1 January 1985 privileges are granted to servicemen and members of their families for rest at tourist bases of the USSR Ministry of Defense. We have asked the Chief of the Tourism and Tours Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Major General A. Gashchuk, to tell us about this.

In recent years, much has been done in the Armed Forces for the development of tourism--excellent means for an active rest, to improve health, and to increase physical tempering. In particular, the modern complexes of "Krasnaya Polyana," "Kudepsta," "Razliv," "Terskol," "Sukhumi," "Borovoye," "Kichkina," "Sevastopol," "Primorsk," "Turkestan," "Teberda," and others have been built and are constantly being modernized. In this way, the capabilities of the bases to ensure the active rest of servicemen, members of their families, and workers and employees of the Soviet Armed Forces have been expanded significantly.

A new and striking manifestation of the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the Soviet Armed Forces is the decision concerning the granting, beginning 1 January 1985, to persons of the officer corps, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], extended-service servicemen, and women who have been accepted as volunteers for active military service as soldiers, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers, of travel permits for rest at tourist bases of the Ministry of Defense with the payment of 25 percent of their cost. Members of servicemen's families have the right to acquire permits with a 50-percent reduction. The free travel of one family member on a preferential permit to the tourist base and return is also envisaged.

Included among the members of servicemen's families who have the right to be provided with permits for tourist bases of the Soviet Ministry of Defense under preferential conditions are the wife (husband), children from 5 to 16 years of age, and children from 16 to 18 years of age who are students attending educational institutions.

Servicemen and members of their families who have received preferential permits to sanatoria or rest homes and military travel documents (monetary funds) do not

have the right to receive preferential permits for rest at tourist bases in the same year, and permits for tourist bases can be sold to them with payment of the full cost in accordance with the first group of prices. Upon their request, servicemen and members of their families are permitted to extend the period of the permits for tourist bases in exceptional cases with the payment of their full cost in accordance with the first group of prices. The tourist bases do not have the right to sell preferential permits and receive tourists (including children) under preferential conditions with payment at the location.

The tourist bases of the Ministry of Defense will accept first of all with preferential permits servicemen and members of their families who do not need health resort treatment. It is not permitted to accept people at tourist bases without permits.

Displaying constant concern for the organization of rest and improvement of the servicemen's health, commanders of troop units, installations, and military educational institutions, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations should render assistance to the departments of tourism and tours of districts, groups of forces, and fleets, and tourist clubs in the uniform sending of servicemen and members of their families to rest at tourist bases during the year. In which regard, it is determined which of the officers and members of their families are given preferential permits at what times so that at least one month prior to calling at the tourist base they know of the commander's decision concerning the preferential permits allotted to them.

Now preparation of the material base, buildings for sleeping, dining rooms, and sports and other installations is being conducted at tourist bases for the reception of tourists with preferential permits, programs for family rest for servicemen with children and tourist and tour routes are being worked out, and cadres of instructors and tutors are being trained.

All this will permit ensuring the rest of servicemen and members of their families in an organized and quality manner at tourist bases in accordance with preferential permits.

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ARMED FORCES

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ARMED FORCES

OFFICER'S CAREER-LONG DRINKING PROBLEM

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 22 November 1984 carries on page 4 a 750-word article by G. Konyushkova, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, entitled: "Bitter Hangover: A History Which Began With a Wine-Glass..." which details the results of one officer's career-long bout with alcohol. The author provides lengthy discussion of the family troubles resulting from Nikolai's drinking. The final result is inevitable. After twenty-four years service in the Army Nikolai is dishonorably discharged from the Army with the loss of all retirement and other benefits. He is said to leave the service only to face disgrace in the civilian world.

CSO: 1801/81

GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE TROOPS' MOUNTAIN TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Gds Lt N. Zaytsevskiy, Red Banner Turkestan Military District:
"By a Surprise Attack"]

[Text] Guards Captain V. Drozdov, commander of an airborne battalion, pored over a map as he analyzed the situation. He recalled his senior chief's instructions before the beginning of this particular phase of the exercise: Pursuing the "enemy," never lose sight of the overall situation, consider all of its nuances.

The airborne troops were relentlessly pursuing the "enemy," crowding him into a narrow mountain valley. But as soon as the battalion reached the defile into the valley the assault troops were blanketed by fire from a neighboring summit. The "enemy" had obviously managed to call in reinforcements by radio. Fresh forces occupied advantageous fire positions beforehand. Now, capitalizing on the interruption in the advance of the attackers, the "enemy" made his attempt to cross the river and slip out of the valley. The clock was ticking away, minute by minute.

Guards Captain Drozdov decided to hit the hills with the fire of an attached battery. But before his eyes the fire positions kept returning to life after being softened by artillery. Rock-encircled weapon pits and caves offered dependable shelter. This meant that the fire strike had to be combined with a transfer of a group of airborne troops to the vicinity of the strongpoint.

The battalion commander had no doubts as to whom he should send out on this complex and risky mission. Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Bychkov, of course. The officer was not unfamiliar with the mountains. And many times he was able to get out of various difficult situations with honor.

It took just seconds to coordinate the actions in relation to lines and time. Guards Senior Lieutenant Bychkov has an intuitive understanding of what the battalion commander wants.

The group of airborne troops set off for the hill occupied by the "enemy."

Time dragged on unbearably slowly. Guards Captain Drozdov would impatiently glance in the direction of the radio operator. Finally the radio set came

alive: "Eddy, this is Storm. Two three seven." This meant that the airborne troops were at the foot of the summit, ready to make their final lunge.

The minute hand ticked on toward the mark at which the command to open fire would be given. An artillery raid would compel "enemy" observers to take cover, and deprive them of the possibility for keeping watch on the approaches to the fire positions. This was also the moment at which the group led by Guards Senior Lieutenant Bychkov was to initiate its attack.

The thunder of an artillery volley echoed through the canyon. Concealed by brushwood, the airborne troops watched the shells shatter the rocky basalt. The rock fragments even flew as far as their position.

Bychkov attentively watched the progress of the second hand. The plan was to attack immediately after the final volley of the gunners, and to stun the defenders by a surprise attack.

"Forward!" the officer commanded. The airborne troops dashed forward among the boulders. Taking cover where they found it, they attacked the hill. The "enemy" showed no signs of life. But suddenly there was a burst of fire from a cave. Guards Private V. Bugayev fired accurately in the direction of the surviving fire position. Guards Private 1st Class A. Verenya supported his comrade. The distance to the caves and rocky weapon pits grew shorter and shorter. Then the hand grenades were put to use.

A minute later Guards Senior Lieutenant Bychkov reported to the battalion commander: The "enemy" fire positions had been suppressed. At that same moment engines roared into action in unison below. Now that it was possible to pass through the defile unhindered, the battalion rushed toward the river in order to destroy the "enemy" as he attempted to lay a temporary bridge.

11004

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

COMMANDERS CRITICIZED FOR NOT ORGANIZING COMPETITIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col P. Chernenko, Red Banner Far East Military District:
"Losing Altitude: Why 1st Squadron of a Certain Air Regiment Did Not Fulfill
Its Socialist Pledges"]

[Text] The first time I visited this air unit was at the beginning of the training year. Flying was under way at the airfield. It was proceeding intensively. It seemed to me that the fighter-bombers were taking off and landing without interruption. The cold winter sky shook from the roar of powerful turbines. And technicians and mechanics bustled by the airplanes on the ground. It was pleasant to watch them work--there was a sense of enthusiasm in their effort.

I spoke with many people during that visit. And when the discussion turned to the leaders of the socialist competition and the unit's best subunits, it was almost like a conspiracy; everyone named the same subunit--1st Squadron, under the command of Major V. Ivantsov. It was emphasized that this squadron was fighting for the outstanding title.

A year later I visited this unit once again. I inquired about the results with which the regiment's best squadron had finished the training year. Had it become an outstanding subunit?

"There's nothing to be proud about. 1st Squadron failed to fulfill its pledges," a note of pity could be heard in the voice of Lieutenant Colonel N. Novikov, the regiment deputy commander for political affairs. "Their burden turned out to be more than they could bear."

As it turned out, the squadron not only failed to rise to new summits in military labor, but it is also gradually slipping from its previously won positions. Some groups and flights which had been outstanding were unable to reaffirm this title. This pertains first of all to Captain Yu. Ivanov's flight, which forfeited its right to call itself outstanding due to near-accidents in the air. Subordinates of Senior Lieutenant V. Korolev also witnessed a drop in their combat training indicators, even though this air armament group was believed to be the squadron's best at the beginning of the training year.

Just in September two near-accidents were caused in the air at the fault of squadron personnel. Aircraft technicians lieutenants A. Churin and G. Starovoytov were responsible for them.

Things are not all well with discipline in the subunit either. Reprimands were given to Private K. Al'peisov, Junior Sergeant O. Shvetsov, Lieutenant G. Yushkov and Senior Lieutenant S. Bondarenko. And this list could be lengthened.

Why had such a metamorphosis occurred in this leading collective? To answer this question I talked with the squadron commander, Major Ivantsov, and his deputy for political affairs, Major L. Gladkov. The discussion was not an honest one at first. Trying to somehow justify the state of affairs that had evolved, Major Ivantsov blamed objective causes. The missions facing the personnel supposedly grew more complex, many pilots and technicians had been rotated out, and young airmen joined the subunit.

But were things really any different in other years? Moreover such changes happened in other of the unit's subunits as well. This meant that the squadron's setbacks were owing to something else other than these "objective" causes. "But what?" I asked. Ivantsov pondered for a moment, collecting his thoughts.

"To be honest," the officer said, "there is but one cause--we forgot about competition among the airmen, we left it to its own resources. While at the beginning of the year both the party bureau and I tried to contribute an element of rivalry into all of our efforts, and maintained the spark of competition, later on we basically gave up after a certain incident which we interpreted as something that was going to keep us from ever becoming outstanding soldiers."

But violation of the rules of flying was not the entire reason, as Ivantsov asserts, why everyone gave up. On analyzing the state of affairs in the subunit I became persuaded that the main cause behind the failure to fulfill adopted socialist pledges lay in the work style of the executives themselves. The squadron commander and his deputies were simply too busy throughout the year to organize competition and to manage it. The squadron's active party members also understated the mobilizing power of socialist competition. This is why a persistent struggle to fulfill adopted pledges was not waged among the airmen. The subunit forgot about Lenin's principles of organizing socialist competition--visuality, comparability of results and possibilities for practical repetition of the best experience. The competition results were summarized rarely, it is true, but at least they were summarized; but no one here even thinks about publicizing the experience of the best specialists, even though the squadron does contain many masters of military affairs (despite the fact that it is now in last place in the regiment).

Take as an example the flight under the command of Captain N. Skachko. His subordinates attained high results in combat training--all are 1st class pilots and masters of combat application. What do the other flights know of Captain Skachko's "secrets" of pilot training? Alas, no one had studied or generalized

this experience. And without a doubt it might have provided a great deal to other airmen, especially the young ones. Had they heeded this experience, lieutenants V. Terekhov and V. Konstantinov might not have made their gross errors in the air.

There is also something to learn from Senior Lieutenant V. Rezhitskiy. The maintenance group of which he is in charge is outstanding. There is something to learn, but no one is learning it.

I already mentioned that socialist competition had been moved to the back burner in the activities of the squadron party organization as well. It would be pertinent to discuss the work of the communists in greater detail. For practical purposes the party bureau never conducted a concrete examination of the progress the airmen were making in fulfilling their pledges throughout the year. Here is a typical example. Communist Senior Lieutenant Bondarenko, secretary of the squadron Komsomol organization, was once invited to a meeting of the party bureau to explain his official misconduct. Many questions were asked, except one: What sort of progress was the officer making on his pledges, and what kind of help was he providing the commander in organizing socialist competition among Komsomol members? Need we be amazed after this that the Komsomol members showed no initiative and creativity in anything they did?

During this last business trip I asked the following question of more and more people: What sort of impact was the unit command and the party committee having on the state of affairs in the squadron? And here is the picture that materialized. The party committee never found time in the entire training year to hear what Major Ivantsov had to say about the progress of his subordinates in fulfilling their pledges. Perhaps as with the squadron communists the members of the party committee felt that 1st Squadron was not destined to be an outstanding subunit. True, a gross near-accident occurred in the subunit at the beginning of the year at the fault of Senior Lieutenant G. Shishlov. It would have been natural to expect that the commander and the party organization of the squadron would have learned their lesson from the incident and directed their efforts at improving the flying proficiency of the airmen and their special knowledge. But alas, the unit did not take any concrete steps to mobilize the airmen to raise their combat readiness.

What had in fact been done? Punishment of the squadron commander was announced in a regimental order, a couple or so corrective actions were demanded, but things did not go any farther, as if no other help was really needed. Is this perhaps not why the airmen gave up and, on encountering indifference on the part of the regiment command, ceased fighting to fulfill their pledges? And as a result, new near-accidents and violations of military discipline followed.

I never did get a concrete answer to this question: What progress was being made in fulfilling socialist pledges in the squadron? Neither Major Ivantsov nor Major Gladkov knew what officers pledged to become outstanding soldiers of combat and political training, or which flights and groups had attained any particular levels of proficiency. And yet this is not the first year that Major Ivantsov has been at the squadron's helm.

Nonetheless I must say that the squadron we are talking about is not all that bad. Pilots are preparing themselves for higher class qualifications. It must be noted that 1st Squadron's technical zone is the best kept in the regiment. There have been other successes as well, and they should not be cancelled out. They are a credit to all personnel of the subunit. But had constant attention been devoted to socialist competition, the squadron would not have found itself worse off at the end of the training year than at its beginning.

Special concern is elicited by the fact that things are not all that well with organization of socialist competition in the unit's other subunits either. Can we really say that things are normal when the airmen do not even know who they are competing with, and who achieved what results? And after all, passionate speeches were made at meetings held at the beginning of the training year, during which promises to initiate competition and to attain high results in combat training were made. They talked about it, and they forgot. Both their promises and their pledges.

We often say that nothing is unimportant in competition. And visibility is a concept that can in no way be treated as being unimportant. When competition winners are announced and when the experience of the leaders is publicized, soldiers are forced to go beyond their present achievements, to move steadily forward, to attain new summits in combat proficiency. Unfortunately not all commanders and political workers of the air regiment recognized this principle. This is why Lieutenant Colonel Novikov says that "...we still encounter a great deal of formalism in this area."

But who other than the political workers and active party members should be the ones to fight this formalism and to uproot it while it is still embryonic! If the regiment commander is aware of shortcomings in competition organization, if this troubles him, then as logic would have it, he must do everything possible to eliminate the shortcomings in such an important matter. And the first and foremost thing he must do is to lay the highest demands upon himself and the immediate organizers of competition. To date, such demands have not been levied. Nor have any efforts been made in the direction of improving the affairs of this once outstanding squadron.

11004

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

OUTSTANDING COMMANDER SAM BATTALION PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Col G. Verbitskiy: "Angle of Elevation"]

[Text] The guide rails of the launchers with the silvery bodies of missiles frozen on them are slowly rising above the launch position. The last moments prior to launch....

The commander of the surface-to-air [SAM] missile battalion, Lieutenant Colonel N. Gerasimenko, is in one of the cabs at a work site. He is giving the latest instructions to his subordinates and reports readiness for action.

And then the first report from the battery commander, Captain L. Shevchenko:

"I am tracking the target...."

The target is small. It is good that Captain Shevchenko "locked on" it at maximum range. But can it be that all this is only "bait," as they say?

Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko has operated on exercises with his subordinates many times. Not everything was always smooth in their work. Take the same Captain Shevchenko. Once Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko arrived at the subunit for a night lesson. It did not proceed in the best manner. Shevchenko brandished a stopwatch and hurried the sections. But this only fettered the men's actions. The commander caught in Shevchenko's voice not only notes of vexation, but also of despair. He ordered the chiefs of sections to continue the lesson and he took the battery commander to one side.

"Do you know the rule: in order to destroy the target the missile should occupy the needed angle of elevation? Here a discrepancy is impermissible," Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko said this calmly, but very firmly. "Why didn't you think of the matching of your actions with the sections' level of training?"

Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko left the lessons only when he was convinced that they were being conducted in a methodologically competent manner.

Soon Shevchenko himself approached the battalion commander and requested permission to conduct the improvement of a simulator for the operators. The suggestion

proved to be sensible. And Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko advised the battery commander to involve as many of his subordinates as possible in its introduction. In this joint work, the men drew much that was useful for themselves and delved, as they say, into the very depths of the combat equipment. Their interrelations with the battery commander also became warmer and more confidential. The battalion occupied second place on the next concluding check. In order to become the winner in the competition, at that time the missilemen, lacked the very trifle, as they say -- two excellent grades in the battery commanded by Captain Salmanov.

"You know, Aleksandr Nikolayevich," Gerasimenko shared his thoughts with his deputy commander for political affairs, Major Zakharov, one day. "It seems to me we praised Salmanov too much: he began to devote less attention to equipment and people."

"We should check how the subunit 'breathes'," the political deputy supported him.

The foreboding did not deceive the commander. During the check it turned out that not all parameters of the equipment had been carefully adjusted. However, Captain Salmanov had a rather condescending attitude toward this, explaining that there is still time until the check and they will succeed in catching up.

This fact was evaluated in the strictest manner. An important conversation took place at officers's call and a party meeting. Captain Salmanov was given recommendations on eliminating the shortcomings which had been disclosed. The battalion commander and the party organization took over control of the battery.

Now Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko led his subordinates in an assault of the highest positions in combat improvement. The efforts of the party and Komsomol organizations were also aimed at this. And soon, they began to speak of the battalion as the acknowledged leader in socialist competition.

Now every other serviceman is a specialist with an increased proficiency rating here and many officers are masters of combat qualifications. All the missilemen have confidently mastered one or two allied specialties.

...Analyzing the aerial situation, Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko again looked attentively at the scope of the indicator and noticed a barely noticeable speck in its very corner. It was moving toward the defended objective. At that very moment the voice of the battery commander, Captain Salmanov, sounded on the air:

"I have detected a new target...."

It was as if thunder had rolled over the position: two missiles were swiftly launched from the guide rails and took off in the assigned direction, soon illuminating the sky with two flashes of bursts. The aerial "enemy" did not pass.

There were still many launches in the life of the battalion. The Order of the Red Star sparkled on the chest of Captain Salmanov. Captain Shevchenko had been confirmed for advancement to a higher post. Other officers received

commendations. And each time, together with the words "I serve the Soviet Union!" they thanked from the bottom of their hearts the battalion commander who transferred to them everything better which he knew and was capable of himself.

"Your joy is my joy," Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimenko once said in reply. "That means that we are doing our work skillfully. And this is the highest honor."

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MAINTAINING RADIO RELAY COMMUNICATIONS IN POLAR REGIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian Vol 10, Oct 84, pp 30-31

[Article by Major V. Zakharchenko: "Let's Maintain Reliable Radio-Relay Communication"]

[Text] Maintaining communications is a troublesome and difficult matter, requiring knowledge, training and skill. In the polar regions, the severe conditions in which the specialists carrying out their military mission must operate are also added to all this. Here it is necessary to take into account difficulties in selecting a place to deploy radio relay stations, and the special features of radio wave propagation. One must remember that low and sharply fluctuating temperatures, magnetic disturbances and snow storms affect continuous communications.

Radio relay communications have all the advantages of radio communications (mobility, survivability), and at the same time have the stability of wire. But all these advantages are not realized automatically. Only well-trained and prepared people who can handle equipment capably can realize them. It is especially important that each officer know the specifics of work in polar regions and be able to analyze the situation and draw the right conclusions.

Usually we carry out several special exercises with newly arriving personnel, in which we introduce them to the working routine. For example, as a start we give them the task of preparing their own proposals on deploying supplemental antenna-mast devices. Some commanders take a rather light attitude toward this task. They say, why complicate matters here unnecessarily, and they make serious mistakes in their calculations. It is fitting to analyze the most typical of them, and indicate the reasons that they arose.

Recently Major A. Ponomarev, an experienced specialist, conducted such an exercise. The officer said that the antennas would have to be operated in conditions of frequent and lengthy storms and the presence of permafrost. Stakes for running guy lines could not be driven into the ground, and it was necessary to support them by laying them in holes filled with rocks. Therefore, somewhat more time than normal was allotted to fulfill this norm, corresponding to the additional amount of work. The young commanders also did not provide for measures to protect the antennas from snowdrifts, and, you see, it is necessary in the long polar night to clean snow and ice off of the antenna mast devices, without damaging the insulation covers. It is better to select places for antennas where the wind blows through and snowdrifts do not

accumulate. The smallest mistake in the operation, servicing and maintenance of communications equipment may result in great morale, physical and material losses. It is very difficult to eliminate bugs arising through the fault of one specialist or another under conditions of polar night and arctic cold and wind. Moreover, no one makes allowances for the specific conditions. Communications must always be combat ready. We tirelessly implement this thought, and strive to ensure that every officer, warrant officer and soldier is imbued with understanding and comprehends his full responsibility for the precise, rapid and effective accomplishment of the combat mission.

A decisive factor in maintaining reliable radio relay communications is, in our view, the preparedness and technical training level of the personnel. The primary burden in solving this task is placed on the platoon commanders. Through extensive use of the material-technical base, training stands, placards and simulators, they seek high results in training subordinates. We pay a great deal of attention to actions in difficult, non-standard situations which require from communicators initiative, resourcefulness, endurance and composure. For example, Communist V. Yevstratov, commander of an outstanding platoon, strives to structure and organize each exercise so that it takes place in a situation as close as possible to that of combat. Under his guidance, the specialists obtain practice in eliminating "malfunctions," and they develop determination in the face of the unexpected. When malfunctions appear, the soldiers do not find themselves at a loss, but eliminate them effectively and confidently. In training exercises, light and noise special effects and all sorts of exercise inputs are used.

Training communicators to operate under conditions of passive and active interference is in the minds of all officers. Therefore, interference is present at each exercise, especially deliberate interference which the probable enemy may employ.

Mastering the techniques of protection against enemy weapons of mass destruction is of considerable importance in the successful training of communicators. Usually we develop a series of additional difficulties. We teach them to work under conditions of disrupted temperature conditions, limited visibility and worsening audibility. All of this facilitates the moral-psychological tempering of the soldiers and their professional training. In the platoon about which I speak, the men are completely interchangeable. Everyone who is in a position of a class qualified specialist is so qualified. The communicators operated harmoniously in recent exercises. As an exercise input, the position at the apparatus of Junior Sergeant V. Peredryakin was taken by Junior Sergeant N. Vorobey. He received and transmitted all signals reliably, without delays or distortions, a fact which was noted during the summary of results.

Of course, well organized socialist competition has a special place in military training to maintain radio relay communications. There is no need to prove that the degree of interest and instructiveness of competition, and whether his subordinates can see the actions of their comrade-rival in the competition, and observe his strong and weak points, depends primarily on the commander. Carefully critiquing all stages of the exercise and the actions of each soldier plays an important role in improving exercise quality, and helps bring out unexploited reserves for improving military skill.

To carry out a thorough and instructive critique, we involve experienced officers who teach this to the young commanders through practice. Frequently Captain V. Degtyarev, a specialist first class, has been given this task. As a rule he not only establishes the time required for norm fulfillment and the activeness and training level of individual soldiers, but also observes advanced operating techniques which he then recommends to less experienced specialists. In our view, analyzing specific results of the fulfillment of a given element of the norm, or the exercise as a whole, is an important aspect. Captain V. Degtyarev always compares the results of the competing soldiers, and recalls the indices of previous exercises and combat watches.

He relates the exercise results to the men, which favorably influences the entire overall training process and facilitates the most rapid development of radio mechanics.

When speaking about maintaining reliable radio relay communications, one cannot overlook the question of preparing shifts and communications equipment for combat watch duty. Our officers conduct exercises of this sort in the class devoted to special training. There questions of tuning transmitters and the required norms for conducting stable radio and radio relay communications are worked out.

Shift chiefs, warrant officers V. Bakulin and N. Kondrakhov, have good quality compendiums which they use in the course of independent training before going on combat watch. They contain summaries of the requirements of mandatory documents, duties, and the procedure for going on and off watch. Captain V. Ivanov, deputy commander for political affairs, is most directly involved in the preparation of duty watch shifts. He is a specialist first class and an able methodologist and teacher. He concentrates his attention on working with the station chiefs and mechanics, since it is namely these specialists who are involved with the communications equipment and the soldiers who service it. The political officer gives each officer and warrant officer a specific discussion assignment to be carried out. He instructs on how to organize the sharing of experience, and how to use the materials located in the political education corner. He also sees that the shift personnel have current newspapers and journals.

It has become a hard-and-fast rule for Captain V. Ivanov to speak with each newly arrived soldier on the eve of the start of his combat watch. He takes interest in his frame of mind, encourages him and gives practical advice.

The businesslike and continuous assistance of the political officer has a mobilizing influence on the men, and facilitates carrying out combat watch at a high level of quality. All of this together enables the soldiers in our subunit to fulfill their tasks successfully. Owing to well-organized military training and the presence of modern equipment, we are maintaining continuous and reliable radio relay communications under all conditions.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL COMPETITION ON MILITARY REGULATIONS KNOWLEDGE

Moscow VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian Vol 10, Oct 84, pp 32-34

[Article by Maj Gen G. Noskov, deputy chief of the Pushkin Higher Radioelectronics School of Air Defense: "Ways of Strengthening Knowledge of Regulations"]

[Text] Study of the military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces is given great attention in the VUZ training plan. This is natural, since no other training discipline is so closely linked with the daily activity of the servicemen. It is especially important for young officers to have a firm knowledge of the regulations.

Great attention is devoted to the study of regulations in the Pushkin Higher Radioelectronics Order of the Red Star School of Air Defense. Socialist competition for thorough knowledge of the provisions of regulations significantly helps to achieve high results in this important matter.

The theory of systematic training gives many techniques and methods for studying regulations and understanding their requirements, beginning with the most simple method of study -- independent reading of regulations -- and concluding with problem-solving. But neither understanding or strengthening the knowledge of military regulations is possible without the efforts of the student himself. This can be achieved only through a combination of particular methods for studying regulations with individual and collective competition in the conduct of the lesson. Even in dealing with one another on the basis of the regulations studied, the students are already competing by comparing knowledge. In this undertaking the person is distinguished who has most thoroughly comprehended the essence of the regulatory requirement, and who most persistently remembers and compares new material with that previously studied and makes conclusions for the practical application of knowledge. Competition helps reduce the time required for the study of USSR Armed Forces regulations, and helps to improve the quality and depth of knowledge of the regulations. Without competitiveness in the study of a regulation, there can be no possibility of inculcating love of service and of unit internal order.

Theoretical provisions are studied in planned lessons and in hours of self study, and inculcating and strengthening practical skills in fulfilling regulatory requirements are accomplished in the course of the training process, while on duty and in daily life.

From the experience of our school I know that the most beneficial effect is achieved when the process of studying and strengthening knowledge of regulations takes on the character of competition with the men present, i.e., as "fans," rather than standing apart from the activity. In this is manifested one of Lenin's principles of competition -- publicity. Initial study and strengthening of knowledge of regulatory requirements in basic courses are well "noted" in the "game oriented" method of studying regulations which we previously set forth (see VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY No 5, 1983), and are more applicable in advanced courses in the practice variant.

Along with conducting planned lessons for the study of regulations, the school carries out competitions among teams and individual servicemen according to categories. Rules have been worked out for organizing such a competition in the class, faculty or school, as well as in the department and offices. Carrying out an entire complex of measures of a competitive nature in the training group, class and faculty makes it possible to compare the successes of the individual student and the collective as a whole, which corresponds to Lenin's second principle -- comparability of results. Our competition is active in nature. The participation of personnel in the course of initial competition has the purpose of maximally involving the students of the section, training group and class.

It is necessary to portray the organization and then the execution of competition for knowledge of regulations. It is well known that any contest (in the temporary sense) is an integral part of [socialist] competition. Therefore, in using the term "contest," we have in mind some short-term stage of the whole period (spring or fall) of the school's competition on regulations. In the student subunits, this has been called competition for experts in military regulations. This competition is to thoroughly explain the most important provisions of military regulations, which are the law regulating the life and activity of the troops, and the further improvement of military service and military discipline in the school.

Officers and warrant officers from the faculties, departments, sections and offices, and personnel from the student subunits are involved in the competition. During the training year, socialist competition has four stages:

1st Stage -- determining the best expert on regulations among the officers, warrant officers and training group students. All personnel take part.

2d Stage -- determining the best training group in the class. All training group sections take part in the competition for the purpose of determining the best students in the group, from whom a class team of 10 men is formed (1 or 2 alternates).

3d Stage -- determining the best class in the faculty in knowledge of regulations. The class teams of 10 men each (2 or 3 alternates) participate in the competition.

4th Stage -- determining the best teams of experts in military regulations in the school through competition. Teams of 10 students (3 or 4 alternates) from each faculty take part.

To determine the best experts in military regulations among the school permanent party, a team of three persons (a senior and junior officer and a warrant officer, except two senior officers and a warrant officer where there are no junior officers) is selected from each faculty, section, office and department for the competition.

Organizing the competition is entrusted: in the training groups -- to a class officer; in the class -- to the class leader and members of a committee whom he designates; in a faculty -- to the faculty chief and committee members whom he designates; in departments, sections and offices -- to corresponding commanders and chiefs under the general supervision of the school deputy chief and committee members whom he designates. To conduct the school finals among the teams of students representing a faculty, a committee is organized consisting of one officer and six students from the faculty senior class who are not participating in this competition. The school deputy chief names a separate committee (5 persons) from among officers of the administration to check the written work of the officers and warrant officers.

The competition for experts on regulations takes place during two periods of time: August - October among teams from student subunits, and March - April among students, officers and warrant officers of faculties, departments, sections and offices for individual supremacy. Selection of this period is related to the spring battle drill competition among student subunits.

As a rule, teams from faculties of one class are represented at the competition for school supremacy. But this does not exclude participation of teams of students of various school years, which brings great competitive spirit and involvement of the personnel to the competitive process. The competition for best expert on military regulations among students in training groups, as well as among permanent party of faculties, departments, sections and offices, is conducted in written form. The competition for knowledge of regulations among training group, class and faculty teams is conducted orally, by questioning team members in turn. When it has heard an answer, the opposing team has the right to evaluate its accuracy. Questions for the competition are selected by a committee from a list drawn up in advance in the school and available in all subunits as an attachment to the rules of the competition. Variants of written competitive work, each including five questions (two from the Internal Service Regulation, two from the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulation and one from the Disciplinary Regulation) are compiled for the first stage of the competition. Variants consisting of 10 questions (four each from the Internal Service and the Garrison and Guard Duty regulations and two from the Disciplinary Regulation) are compiled for the

remaining stages of the competition. Each variant provides for three alternate questions. The committee members evaluate the competitors' knowledge on a five point system for each question.

The place of each competitor among the other servicemen is determined by the number of points which he has obtained for his answers to the five questions. For students it is also determined by the average points earned for practical fulfillment of the requirements of military regulations during the preceding school semester.

The place of the subunit in each stage is determined by the average points of the team. The committee has the right to reduce the average points by 1/2 point for shortcomings in outward appearance, failure of team members to observe military courtesy and the requirements of the Drill Regulation, and for imprecise and incorrect stating of a question.

The results of competition are entered in a record signed by the committee chairman and members and approved by the appropriate commander (chief). Victors in the competition for experts in military regulations are given incentive awards within the limits of the authority of immediate and direct supervisors. An order from the head of the school is published on the results of the final competition for supremacy. Victors are decorated. The best experts on regulations among the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and students are awarded certificates. The faculty team which is first among the non-permanent personnel receive an alternating prize and a certificate. The first place permanent party team receives a certificate.

In our school, the competitions for best experts on regulations among the subunit teams and individual servicemen helped make the study of regulations more active, and contributed to a more thorough knowledge of their requirements and the lively exchange of opinions within the student collectives on the importance of regulations in everyday life and service and on the need for their further study. Among the training subunit teams, first place was earned by the team of Senior Sergeant S. Nikolayuk, from the subunit whose class leader is Major S. Istratenko. Second place was awarded to the team led by Junior Sergeant S. Vokhmintsev (class leader Lt Col V. Revyagin). Officers O. Komarov, S. Shapran, S. Stepashov, V. Frolov, Warrant Officer V. Pul'nev, students S. Pushkin, I. Savel'yev, G. Galushkin, S. Stasishin, O. Korzun, and sergeants V. Mikheyev, S. Nikiforov and S. Nauruzbayev were named best experts among the individual servicemen.

The school alternating prize was won by the collective of the class headed by Major S. Istratenko in a difficult struggle. The photographs of the best experts on regulations and of prize-winning subunit teams were put in a special stand on the school parade ground, entitled: "Winners of the Competition for Best Knowledge of the Requirements of USSR Armed Forces Military Regulations."

Our experience enables us to conduct planned competition in the student subunits. The competitive nature of the competition for experts on military regulations introduces a lively current into the activity of the competitors. Carrying out competition in the presence of "fans" from among the students

helps to popularize this method of strengthening knowledge of regulations. In 1984, during the finals of team competitions for knowledge of regulations, the school made a training film and presented it in the combined arms training class for viewing and training of subunit commanders for the next stages of competition.

During the current year we fitted out the room where the methodological class for sergeants' training, the class on military regulations and organization of military service, and the specialized class for the preparation and conduct of guard duty were held. Here, to prepare sentries to fulfill their mission, we use displays in the training (working) places for dialogue between a student and the YeS-1022 computer, using a specially compiled program. The teaching course permits the organization of three modes of operation: exposition, exercise and testing. With the aid of each of these selected modes, students train independently on questions concerning the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulation. As required the subunit commander uses the test mode to carry out rapid direct questioning of each member of the daily detail, with grades displayed on the display screen.

The use of advanced training methodology, conduct of competition on knowledge of regulations among servicemen and school subunit commanders, improving the military training base, and constant education of students in the spirit of regulatory requirements with unity of knowledge and skills, bring favorable results in strengthening military discipline and improving military service and internal order. Commanders of student subunits are given prepared recommendations for controlling the observance of the daily schedule, conducting competition in drill and ceremonies training, preparing individuals for daily guard duty, conducting critiques of training and duty, methods of conducting exams on regulations, etc. The school has developed a definite system and acquired experience in evaluating students on practical fulfillment of regulations. Thus the possibility of repeating the experience of the best subunits always exists. This means that Lenin's third principle of competition is being observed.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Polar light on the border. Outstanding area of Sergeant A. Goryashov operates at the signal, "Approved!"

2. Sr Lt Yu. Gavrilov, a communist and specialist first class, is a military educator of his subordinates. He generously imparts to them his own experience and knowledge, and persistently teaches them military skills. The officer is an excellent methodologist. Such military training class is effective and of high quality. In the photo: Sr Lt Yu. Gavrilov addresses a mission to the crew commander of the ship "V. Lenin".

3. From his first day in the service, Private G. Gerasimov, a communist, has shown himself to be a disciplined and effective soldier. He is the veteran soldier. This comrade's correct methodology has been his guide to all. He has achieved the high position of sergeant. In the photo: G. Gerasimov is addressing the crew commander of the ship "V. Lenin".

and is one of the best crew members of his launcher. Private G. Chazov helps the commander to educate the men through his irreproachable service and mobilizing words. In the photo: Private G. Chazov, ~~Komsomol~~ member, serves vigilantly in the post entrusted to him.

4. Sr Lt Yu. Fadeyev, military pilot second class and member of his air squadron party buro, successfully accomplishes all fighter missions in any meteorological conditions, day and night. The officer is attentive to the experience and knowledge of his fellow servicemen. Being editor of the wall newspaper, this party activist resourcefully discusses the military affairs of leading aviators from the pages of his press organ. This helps them to achieve further new successes in military competition, conduct combat watch vigilantly, strengthen discipline and self-discipline, and fulfill socialist obligations. In the photo: Sr Lt Yu. Fadeyev, communist, enters the cockpit of his fighter.

5. The subordinates of Captain Ye. Stepkin, specialist first class and chief of an excellent section, vigilantly carry out their combat watch. The officer achieves high quality and effective military work from his rocket troops by ably conducting training of his personnel directly on the equipment before beginning combat watch. In the photo: Captain Ye. Stepkin, communist, in his training exercises.

6. Soldiers of the Guards Smolensk, Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Air Defense Missile Regiment of PVO, initiator of socialist competition in the Troops of Air Defense, successfully fulfill heightened commitments. In the photo: ~~Komsomol~~ activists, Guards PFC S. Mel'nikov, operator second class, and Guards privates V. Galyshev and V. Nakadnyuk attentively study the course of fulfillment of socialist commitments.

7. The soldiers have a free moment. Privates I. Masadov, N. Gerasimov and V. Kravchuk surround accordionist PFC S. Bochkarev. Sr Lt S. Ivershin also came up to the soldiers. PFC S. Bochkarev's fingers flew along the accordion keys, and the familiar melodies of beloved songs began to pour out.

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NAVAL FORCES

YOUNG OFFICERS NOT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN EXPERIENCE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Capt Lt G. Litvin, missile boat commander, Twice-Awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "A Lieutenant's Goals"]

[Text] Having achieved persuasive success in training combat, the missile boats returned to base. The senior chief wished to speak to the officer who commanded the ship that struck the main target. Lieutenant B. Dombrovskiy appeared at headquarters.

The admiral was unable to conceal his amazement. It seemed to him that an older commander, and hardly a lieutenant, would have been able to act so faultlessly in the complex conditions. After all, it takes a year or two to acquire command experience. And this commander was so surprisingly young.

The admiral glanced at the lieutenant inquisitively and could not conceal his smile. The surprise was a pleasant one to him. If the officer had managed to prove himself at a difficult command position this early, imagine how much more he could give to the navy.

The admiral spoke with the lieutenant with fatherly tenderness as he recalled his own youth. What specifically was amazing to him? After all, even in those years long ago, promising young officers did find their place quickly in the navy, and they received fast promotions. He shared these thoughts later on with officers at unit headquarters. He expressed his satisfaction in the work being done with young officers.

Yes, the admiral was pleased not only by Lieutenant B. Dombrovskiy himself but also by the fact that the unit had made a proper assessment of the officer and boldly entrusted the lieutenant with a ship command. And they did not err in their decision. Later on this officer managed to surpass the proficiency of many others. For successes in combat training he was awarded the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Degree.

This was interpreted in the unit as a sign of special attention of the command toward all young officers: Show your worth sooner, and your diligence will not go unnoticed.

I heard about this incident from Boris Robertovich Bombrovskiy himself, presently a captain 2d rank and commander of a tactical missile boat formation. Back when I was offered command of a missile boat as a senior lieutenant, I must admit that although I was pleased, I did experience a certain sense of uncertainty as well. I felt it my duty to tell the formation commander about this in all honesty. It was such a great responsibility! He replied by revealing to me a little bit of his own biography, emphasizing that young officers are traditionally held in high trust, and therefore that I should not flounder, that I should go forward boldly and justify this trust, recognizing that this would also have an effect on other officers with whom I would come to serve.

Time passed, and I had gained some experience as a missile boat commander. And all the while I felt the very attentive, benevolent attitude of my senior comrades; I could not say, however, that any special conditions were allowed for me and other young officers. On the contrary the requirements imposed on us were unusually stiff, especially as far as mastering one's specialty was concerned. No time was allowed for relaxation, but all possibilities were afforded for successful development as a commander.

As an example it seemed strange to me to read in the letters of one of my classmates at officers school, with whom I still communicate today, that when he first started to work, he as well as some other school graduates were burdened by all kinds of projects, but there were never given any direct responsibilities. In his letters my friend often complained that time was passing, and so had still not gotten an assignment to a ship. He was completely buried in paperwork.

Of course, one must know how to deal with personnel, administrative and other concerns. Young officers must be taught to do this. But excuses are harmful here. Especially if they are based on a mistrust of lieutenants, on a reluctance on the part of their senior chiefs to take the responsibility to grant young officers the independence they deserve.

Recall as an example the number of staff specialists who are described on a ship with one to two or several routine assignments. In a combat situation, such patronage would be simply impossible. There would not be enough staff officers for all of the ships. And this means that all staff officers, including lieutenants as well, could count only on their own knowledge, habits and experience. Then why should we deprive them now of a responsibility for acquiring the required combat skills? After all, as a result of such heavy patronage young ship officers, especially junior officers, simply get themselves out of the events, becoming their witnesses rather than their participants.

The attitude that lieutenants will have plenty of time when in VVR is mistaken. It is only because of the carelessness of the lieutenants themselves, and unwilling to take it beyond their life position, with whom it was difficult to part even in humanity. There is a saying that an officer becomes a lieutenant at a new position, but he never gets to the 2d and 3d, and a passionate desire to prove himself never comes about. I have known good officers as well,

unfortunately. And yet, had they begun their career with a concerned commander attentive to the aspirations of youth, it may have evolved as it did for Senior Lieutenant S. Lyashchenko, an acquaintance of mine who is in charge of an antiaircraft weapon control group aboard a cruiser. He is known for more than just his competency as a missile specialist. At the very beginning of his career Lyashchenko was the first among school graduates who were permitted to perform the duties of a watch officer on board assigned to a ship.

It should be noted that in that period of time, it was the general prejudice among ship officers that it was risky to allow lieutenants to control a moving cruiser. This is why the wardroom initially took Lyashchenko's aspiration to serve watch on the bridge as the impetuosity of youth. But the ship commander found the young officer's sense of purpose to his liking. With his active assistance Lieutenant Lyashchenko not only passed all of the necessary tests but also practically demonstrated his competency as a watch officer. Since that time young officers have regularly served watch on the bridge of this ship. Lyashchenko, it turned out, had many followers.

Of course, combat training in peacetime conditions sometimes permits a leisurely assumption of duty--and this is true not only of young officers. But to count on this means to dull one's personal combat readiness and to artificially restrain one's potentials. The experience of the Great Patriotic War persuasively attests to the great contribution made by young officers to victory. They possessed sufficient proficiency, maturity and valor to execute the most complex missions at the front and to display heroism. It would be sufficient to recall that out of the total number of naval officers and admirals awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title during the war, about a third were junior lieutenants, lieutenants and senior lieutenants. So, today's young officers, must take this as a moral testament to the young officer generation of frontliners, as a mandate to devote all of the strength of youth to the motherland's service.

But are we always able to compare glorious examples from the past with the way things are today, and all the more so arrive at any conclusions on this basis? Compelling though they may be, the words "we're now living in another age" are no justification. Today has its own complexities, ones which require our complete dedication. This makes it all the more saddening to see older officers wearing a lieutenant's shoulderboards. Like Lieutenant I. Vassilov, who works in our unit. In his time he was unable to hold on to his position as commander of the electrical and engineering division of a missile unit. He was transferred to another ship, where he was assigned lighter duties. It seemed to me personally that he would feel badly, that he would feel ill at ease around other people. But nothing of the kind. As it turns out, Vassilov is happy with his destiny: There are less responsibilities at his new post, and more free time. And there is still time to live to a reputation such, as once noted wittily.

Here is the way he thought: He could be incompetent and inferior during his career, and then when he retired, he would be a wise old man. He figured everything to his benefit: He had the joy of carefree youth, the "inevitability"

of promotions even with minimum effort, and perhaps even a full pension in the future. I think that time and the service will correct Bashirov's life position. But it would be better if this could happen earlier, if the commanders and the officer collective in which he intends to serve peacefully, concernedly, would finally shake this "old man" awake from his blessed dream. After all, parasitism is harmful and contagious. His kind of "wisdom" is readily absorbed. And young officers must be protected from such "wisdom."

The issue of choosing candidates for boat commanders from among deputy commanders sometimes produces difficulties in our unit. Some deputies have not been able to acquire the needed potential while serving at their previous positions. They took too long to get into the swing of it. Yes, a lieutenant's time of service is relatively short, and this time must be served without significant losses. Such losses will make themselves known later on, and it is very difficult to make up for what was lost: Far from all are capable of doing so. To serve with no thought for the future is harmful and unnatural. It is contradictory to the aspirations of youth.

Had any of us, on receiving our diplomas, officer shoulderboards and dirk, not dreamed of climbing to the top in naval service? And are we ourselves more to blame if our noble purpose falls by the wayside soon after graduation? This is sometimes referred to as an error of youth. To make matters worse, everyone knows that the young are forgiven many things. Many things, but not all. We cannot possibly forgive ourselves for rejecting our initial goals.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

INSTRUCTORS LACK NEEDED QUALIFICATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Col A. Kazimiruk, chief, political department of the Leningrad Higher Military Topographic Command School imeni Army General A. I. Antonov: "Who Is to Lead the Cadets?"]

[Text] Quite recently another class of young officers graduated from the school. This was an important event, both to the graduates and to us, the commanders, political workers and instructors who trained and indoctrinated them, and prepared them for independent service in the troops. But each graduation is also always a topic of analysis, of serious thinking. Had we utilized all reserves in training and indoctrinating this group of lieutenants? What had we left out, what must we account for and foresee today in order to improve the training and indoctrination process?

There is much food for thought here. Take as an example Lieutenant Ye. Smirnov, a cadet platoon commander who submitted a request last week to be relieved of his post and assigned to another that was associated less with indoctrination. The officer wrote the request because he recognized that the position was beyond his means.

Smirnov is a recent graduate of ours. He graduated with honors, and as an officer he is a model of diligence and discipline. He is a fabulous specialist. But the platoon under his command was unable to keep up.

"I tried as hard as I could," he declared during the discussion, "but I could not get anywhere. My subordinates don't understand me, and I don't understand them. It's obvious that commanding cadets is not within my vocation. It became clear to me here that a special sort of talent is needed."

Well, we cannot say that Lieutenant Smirnov lacked objectivity. He assessed his educational capabilities self-critically and accurately.

But unfortunately not every officer is capable of understanding that a "special talent" is in fact necessary for work with cadets. This was demonstrated once again at a seminar we recently sponsored, in which the role of subunit commanders in the training and indoctrination of future officers was examined. For example Captain V. Gorbunov, who spoke at the seminar, passionately defended a position

which basically boiled down to the idea that strictness must be the principal means of indoctrination of cadets.

Of course, strictness is necessary. But it alone cannot produce success. Moreover things are not all that well with training and discipline in the company under Captain Gorbunov's command.

Counting on strictness alone, in their daily practical work not only Captain Gorbunov but also other officers do not even try to understand that their subordinates are not simply servicemen, they are also people who are themselves training to become commanders. This is precisely where the main difference lies in the work of the commander of a cadet subunit. He does not simply command; by his actions he also teaches how to command. He not only indoctrinates, but he also teaches the art of indoctrination using the entire complex of techniques available to him; working together with active party and Komsomol members, he demonstrates to the cadets how they should rely upon and direct the party and Komsomol organizations toward successful fulfillment of the mission. It is not enough for him, a commander (naturally this pertains equally to a political worker or instructor at the school), to possess only the qualities inherent to a Soviet officer. He must also be able to infuse these qualities into a cadet, to shape his personality. This puts great responsibility upon all of us. Each of our actions, each of our deeds is in a sense duplicated and adopted by the future officers, very often becoming points of reference in their own practical activities.

Once during a visit to the troops I had the opportunity to analyze the work style of one of our graduates--an officer with 3 years of service behind his back. His excessive familiarity with subordinates caught my eye. And in cases where a certain individual committed an offense, he often punished the entire platoon: He cancelled leaves or he drilled the platoon after hours.

"Where did you pick up these faulty methods?" I asked him.

"What's faulty about them?" the officer queried in disbelief. "This is the way our platoon commander at school always handled things. And it worked."

It has long been known that the successes of subordinates in service and in training depend to a significant degree on the commander. And that is true for failures as well. But the commander of a cadet subunit is also responsible for how well his graduates do their work years later. A cadet, a future officer is like a mirror of his commander. And it is not until he absorbs everything that he sees in his commander that he begins to feel ready to command others himself.

But what might a future officer absorb if for example his commander has no experience in working with people, if he is unable to find the right solutions to complex situations, and if he bases his indoctrination on strictness alone?

I still remember well my school commanders, Captain N. Vas'kovskiy and Major A. Pisarev. Captain Vas'kovskiy for example based his indoctrination work on the idea of meticulously seeking and developing all of the best in each cadet.

He persuaded us that we were capable of much more than we knew or achieved at the given moment. We believed in him, and sure enough, we achieved much more. Both my comrades and I have used that platoon commander's technique throughout all of our careers, and we are still using it successfully today. Major Pisarev taught us to focus on what is most important in all matters, and not to disperse our effort. He was well developed physically, and our entire company became ranked sportsmen. He was an educated, well-read person. Books became our permanent companions as well.

Given all of the positive qualities of these officers, I think that their age had great significance. They were about 10 years older than us. This difference in age represented a certain amount of experience in life and service, and it made them greater in our estimation, and elicited sincere respect.

But then, what sort of person do cadets want their commander to be? Once we took a poll of all four classes. The responses allowed us to create the general profile of such a commander. He must be strict and just, tactful, erudite, he must have an excellent knowledge of his field and of life in the troops, and he must possess a feeling for the new and a sense of humor. In the opinion of most of the cadets all of these requirements were satisfied by officers N. Ryabikin, V. Gutsalo, S. Sugrobov, V. Povarov, A. Batargin, Ye. Borisov and A. Mos'kin.

Here is an interesting touch: The subunits under the command of these officers have been among the best over a number of years. And one more not unimportant detail: The average age of these officers is 30 but Lieutenant Smirnov is only 23. This obviously did not play the last role in the fact that even with his outstanding training he was unable to gain the required authority among his cadets. The young officer lacked experience and the wisdom of life.

I encountered the same thing in other schools where I had served previously. But the practice of appointing school graduates to the posts of cadet sub-unit commanders goes on. Wherever you go, you see yesterday's cadets teaching tomorrow's officers. Even at our school.

It stands to reason that the command and political department provide all possible assistance to young officers. Some of them are fulfilling their responsibilities rather successfully. But this is more likely the exception than the rule. No matter how hard they try, most young commanders find that things are not going as they would like. Their young age and the absence of work experience in the troops have an effect. It would be pertinent to recall here that even during the Great Patriotic War, when our front constantly lacked command personnel, the most experienced and best-trained officers were sent to the schools and training units as a rule. And this practice justified itself.

Why are military schools of higher education often compelled to use inexperienced officers and school graduates as commanders? One of the reasons is that it is extremely difficult to pull a competent officer out of the

troops. Unit commanders agree to assume such positions very reluctantly, only under great pressure. And yet the number of cases where the troops try to "unload" officers who are weak in all respects at the schools is beyond counting.

Sometimes it is taken to the point of the ridiculous. Not that long ago Senior Lieutenant V. Petyukevich was appointed to the position of cadet platoon commander. On acquainting ourselves with his personal file, we found it bulging with unfavorable reports: "Command skills and volitional qualities are passable. He has a quick temper.... Places little reliance on active party and Komsomol members, does not have enough experience in working with people. Not always demanding of subordinates, unable to determine what is most important in his work...." And the conclusion drawn from his performance reports was this: "Worthy of appointment to the position of cadet platoon commander."

The problem of selecting and training commanders for schools is not new. In particular it was discussed at the All-Army Conference of Executives of Military Schools and Personnel Organs of the USSR Ministry of Defense 2 years ago, in which I had the opportunity to participate. Workable, effective recommendations were worked out at that time for the personnel organs. But we have not yet seen any noticeable improvements due to their implementation. I base my opinion on more than just my own school. I often meet colleagues from other schools, and they report the same problems, the same unresolved issues.

How to reorganize this system and make it more effective is a matter for competent organs. But it is entirely obvious that persons selected to be commanders of cadet subunits must be highly experienced, and they must have an interest in educational work. I think it would be expedient to create special commissions for their selection, staffed by commanders, political workers, personnel officers, and mandatorily, military school representatives. And then the chosen officers should be assigned to training groups, in Vystrel schools for example, so that they could supplement their knowledge of education and psychology, acquaint themselves more deeply with the peculiarities of work with cadets, and study the best forms and methods of indoctrination of army youth.

The time has obviously come to also think about ways to raise the prestige of command positions in military schools. It is no secret that some excelling, promising officers often feel it an insult to be transferred from the troops to a school, feeling that such an appointment is some sort of punishment, one which promises to shut off career opportunities.

It stands to reason that all of this requires a great deal of organizational and educational work, and additional outlays and efforts. But it is worth it. The kind of person that joins the troops and the extent to which he is prepared to teach and indoctrinate personnel depend in many ways on the commander that leads the cadets.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO MINI-SUBS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Mikhaylov and Capt 2d Rank B. Tyurin: "Ultrasmall Submarines"]

[Text] The navies of capitalist countries have already been working for many decades on the tactics and technical resources used in reconnaissance and sabotage operations under water employing special subunits of combat divers. Mini-subs, human torpedoes, exploding boats and divers equipped with SCUBA gear and demolition charges have all been in the armed forces of Germany, Italy, the USA, England and Japan as far back as in World War II.

July 1945. The Japanese cruisers "Takao" and "Mioko" were standing well protected in the harbor at Singapore. It seemed as if nothing threatened their security. Suddenly a deafening explosion shook the anchorage in the night of 30 July. As the foreign press reported later on, the cruiser "Takao" had its bottom blown out. It sank to the bottom of the harbor, where it remained until the end of the war.

Here is how W. Holmes, a former submarine officer in the U.S. Navy, described this operation, so incomprehensible to the Japanese, in his book.

The command of the U.S. Navy was seriously concerned that the two Japanese heavy cruisers might affect the success of forthcoming combat operations in the Southwest Pacific. The English proposed destroying them with the help of mini-subs, which should have been able to penetrate into the harbor and perform their sabotage there. Many experts viewed this plan as outright suicide, but no one could come up with anything else.

The English mini-subs XE-1 and XE-3 were towed at night to an area near Singapore harbor. Early in the morning, XE-3 made its way through the channel and reached the passage through the harbor boom. Getting through it safely, the submarine was able to detect the cruiser "Takao," well camouflaged to blend in with the surrounding landscape. At 1532 hours a diver left the submarine and secured six mines to the cruiser's keel. After this the XE-3 passed beneath the bottom of the ship and dropped its main charges beneath its keel.

The submarine XE-1 followed the path taken by XE-3, but it was unable to approach the second Japanese cruiser, the "Mioko." Then a decision was made to duplicate the actions of the crew of XE-3.

There are many instances of such sabotage in the history of World War II. Sabotage of this sort was also conducted in subsequent years. Citing the experience of combat operations in Korea, in Southeast Asia and in the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands, and analyzing major maneuvers conducted in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, foreign military experts assert that under certain conditions special reconnaissance and sabotage subunits equipped with the appropriate technical gear could have a significant impact on amphibious operations and do significant damage to the enemy's ships and coastal facilities. Mini-submersibles are viewed in this case as one of the principal technical resources of such subunits.

Submarines with a displacement not exceeding 100 tons are categorized abroad as mini-submersibles (Photograph 1 [photographs not reproduced]). In the opinion of foreign specialists these submarines should be designed to be multipurpose craft right from the start. In addition to transporting combat divers (reconnaissance and sabotage groups), they must be adapted to antisubmarine defense, and to action against enemy submarines and vessels both in coastal zones and in the open sea; their design must allow them to covertly mine channels, narrows at harbor exits and so on. The opinion is stated that the design of mini-submersibles should foresee the possibility for exchanging the kind of armament it carries--mine, torpedo and missile, and the resources used to transport combat divers.

Foreign military specialists feel that mini-submersibles will basically perform their missions in coastal areas of seas in not very deep waters. At the same time not only must they be highly maneuverable, but they must also possess good navigating qualities and be able to travel independently for not less than 10 days.

Small special-purpose submersibles are also being developed for various sorts of underwater observations (photograph 2), and the training of frogmen is being organized.

In terms of their design, there can be both double-hull and saddle-tank mini-submersibles. What these terms mean is that the pressure hull may be completely (in the double-hull submarine) or partially (in the saddle-tank submarine) lined with a light streamlined outer hull imparting navigating qualities to the craft and providing room for both the main and auxiliary ballast tanks.

Saddle-tank submarines are usually designed as a cylinder of large diameter tapering at the stern into a spindle-shaped structure. Double-hull submarines consist of large and small diameter hulls fitting within one another.

The journal NAVY INTERNATIONAL provides a description of Italian SX-404 and SX-506 submarines as well as a new design that has been labeled SX-756.

According to data in the foreign press this submarine has a displacement of about 80 tons, it is 25.2 m long, and it is 2.62 m wide. Its surface speed is 8.5 knots (full speed) or 7 knots (for economical operation). Maximum submerged speed is 6 knots. The submarine's diving depth is 100 m. Its cruising range is 1,600 nautical miles on the surface and 60 miles under water.

It can travel independently for 7-12 days. It carries a crew of 6. In addition 8 frogmen can be carried aboard the submarine.

The SX-756 submarine has a double-hull design. The pressure hull, within which the principal mechanisms and equipment are installed and the crew and frogmen are located, is made of steel, while the light outer hull, which imparts a streamlined shape to the submarine, is made from fiber glass. The pressure hull consists of two cylinders located one atop the other. The first contains the living and service compartments, the propulsion unit and the main apparatus and equipment, while the second contains the storage batteries, fuel tanks and ballast tanks. In the opinion of foreign specialists this hull design imparts rather good navigating qualities to the craft when traveling primarily on the surface.

The craft's main hull is divided by bulkheads into three compartments--a bow compartment (the crew quarters), a central post and a power supply block. Propulsion is provided by engines for travel on the surface (a 300 horsepower diesel engine) and submerged (a 55 horsepower electric motor). The outfit of standard equipment includes a gyrocompass, a periscope, an underwater communication set, an automatic control system, main and auxiliary echo sounders, a log, an automatic direction-finder, and wide-band radio communication resources. Reviewers note that a satellite communication system can also be installed aboard the SX-756.

Now a few words about the submarine's armament. In its standard variant it carries six large Mk 21 demolition charges (the explosive weight in each is 300 kg) and 11 small Mk 11 demolition charges (each carrying 50 kg of explosives). In addition the armament outfit can include 40 adhesive mines, 2 to 4 single-tube torpedo launchers, bottom mines, 6 containers for storing weapons, ammunition and other gear for frogmen, and apparatus with which to tow divers beneath the water.

Judging from reports in the journals MILITARTECHNIK and NAVY INTERNATIONAL, an active effort is being made to design mini-subs in the FRG as well. The IKL [transliteration] design office and the Reynshtal' Nordzeyeverke [transliteration] shipbuilding enterprise are in charge of their production. These organizations developed plans for "70," "Piranha" and MSV 75 class submarines. These submarines are small (about the size of the Italian submarines). The size of the crew and the quantity of frogmen they can transport are similar as well. But while "70" class submarines are limited to a diving depth of 100 m, and their cruising range is 1,000 nautical miles on the surface at a speed of 6 knots (which is generally close to the figures for Italian mini-subs), somewhat different data are indicated in the press for the MSV-75 submarine: diving depth--130 m, cruising range on the surface--2,900 nautical miles at a speed of 4 knots.

According to the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW the MSV 75 submarine has a double-hull design consisting of three blocks secured together by bolts. This is done so that the submarine could be transported, disassembled and then reassembled at a dock in any region of the World Ocean. Moreover in its torpedo carrying variant, an additional section 2.4 m long containing torpedo fire control instruments is foreseen in the boat between the forward and central blocks.

Project "70" is classified as a saddle-tank design. One of its most obvious external recognition features is a highly elaborate hull superstructure containing an airlock used to take aboard and launch frogmen, and a diesel charging shaft. The upper part of the outer hull has special recesses into which exchangeable armament can be inserted. Its outfit is to include surface-launched antiship cruise missiles.

The foreign press has reported that English planners are designing mini-sub jointly with specialists of the FRG.

Beside mini-sub, special vehicles intended for one, two or three persons are foreseen for covert delivery of frogmen to a site at which sabotage is to be performed (photograph 3). These are a further development of so-called human torpedoes of World War II. Possessing practically identical technical characteristics, such vehicles are distinguished by their diving depth and the amount of navigation gear they carry.

The weight of a CE2F/X60 vehicle is 2,400 kg, its length is 7 m and its width is 0.8 m. Its speed is 4.5 knots, and its range is 50 km. Its propulsion unit consists of an electric motor operated by lead-acid storage batteries. Four forward gears and two reverse gears are foreseen. When the craft is in motion the divers sit in a cockpit covered by a transparent organic glass canopy. They connect their personal SCUBA to an onboard breathing system built into the transporter.

The USA is also designing underwater resources for delivering frogmen. The "Dart" is one such craft. On the outside it looks like a torpedo-shaped boat made of nonmagnetic material (fiber glass). Two transparent deflectors protect the crew from the oncoming water flow. The transporter travels at 8 knots independently for 3.5 hours. A somewhat modified version of this submarine is the "Minisub." This craft can travel on the surface as well. It surfaces and dives with the assistance of ballast tanks filled with sea water and purged with a built-in compressed air system.

Other capitalist countries are also designing similar resources for conveying frogmen.

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AFGHANISTAN

SKRIZHALIN CLAIMS PANJSHER VALLEY 'CLEARED'

PM081507 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian on 27 October 1984 in its Second Edition publishes on page 3 under the rubric "On Afghanistan's Soil" and the headline "Next to the Clouds" a 1,400-word report by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Skrizhalin on the supply and relief of Afghan and Soviet army outposts in the Panjsher Valley. Following the military operation this summer, Skrizhalin says, the Panjsher Valley was "cleared of bandits" and the Dushmans lost their "through route" between Pakistan and the DRA interior. Skrizhalin describes how army outposts were set up on the heights above the valley in places "so inaccessible" that they can only be reached by helicopter, and goes on to describe a routine helicopter mission he accompanied to "resupply and relieve" some of these outposts, emphasizing the skills of the helicopter crews in negotiating such "difficult terrain."

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